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CAN’T BUY A THRILL:∗ SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND
CRIMINALIZING SEX TOYS
RICHARD GLOVER∗∗
This Comment explores the split between the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits on the issue of sexual privacy and statutes that ban the sale and
distribution of sexual devices. Through a discussion centered around
Lawrence v. Texas, the Comment argues that the statutes, although perhaps
silly or repugnant, are not unconstitutional as a matter of privacy,
substantive due process liberty, equal protection, nor First Amendment
sexual expression. In fact, a finding of unconstitutionality could potentially
do more harm than good to the greater goals of understanding female
sexuality and providing sexual realization and autonomy. Those goals will
be best served, as they have been thus far, via legislative means and further
scientific research into the role and nature of sex and orgasm in modern
relationships.
I. INTRODUCTION
It’s the day for civic freebies as a number of businesses in New York City and across
the country offer giveaways to voters who have cast their ballots. Starbucks is giving
away free cups of coffee, Ben and Jerry’s will give away free scoops of ice cream . . .
and Krispy Kreme is giving away star-shaped donuts with patriot sprinkles . . . .
1
Elsewhere, a more unusual giveaway . . . has drawn a lot of attention.

∗
Can’t Buy a Thrill is the title of the first album from recording artist Steely Dan. The
band was named after “Steely Dan III from Yokohama,” a strap-on dildo referred to in the
William Burroughs novel, The Naked Lunch.
∗∗
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2010; B.S., University of Tulsa, 2000. I
would like to thank my friends and family for their unflagging emotional support, insightful
comments, and good humor, particularly when I was unwilling or unable to accept any of it.
Thanks in particular to my parents, my sister, Sarah Kalemeris, Tom Gaeta, Nick Terrell,
Kevin King, and Kristen Knapp.
1
Jennifer Lee, Taking Election Freebies Without Guild, NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 4, 2008,
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/taking-election-freebies-without-guilt;
see
also Mike Stuckey, Free Sex Toys–and Much More–for Voting, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 3, 2008,
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On Election Day, November 4, 2008, Babeland, a sex toy retail chain,
rewarded voters in New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle with free devices.2
For men, there was the “Maverick,” “always there to lend a hand,” and
ready to “buck[] the status quo”;3 for women, there was the “Silver Bullet,”
because “what our country needs right now [is] a magical solution . . ., a
great stress-reliever during these troubled economic times.”4 The response
was overwhelming.5 Babeland was inundated with requests to the point that
the company had to hire additional staff and ran low on supplies.6 One
possible explanation for the outstanding success of the promotion is
summed up in the assertion that “[s]ex crosses party lines.”7 It does not,
however, appear to cross state lines.
Alabama, Mississippi, and Virginia presently criminalize the
marketing and sale of sexual devices—objects created primarily to
stimulate human genitals. The Alabama and Mississippi statutes have
withstood legal challenges in the Eleventh Circuit. The Virginia statute has
not yet been challenged. Texas has a similar ban, but in early 2008, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared the statute an unconstitutional
burden on the people’s substantive due process right to sexual autonomy.
This Comment explores the split between the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits on the issue of sexual privacy and statutes that ban the sale and
distribution of sexual devices. Through a discussion centered around
Lawrence v. Texas, the Comment argues that the statutes, although perhaps
silly or repugnant, are not unconstitutional as a matter of privacy,
substantive due process liberty, equal protection, nor First Amendment
sexual expression. In fact, a finding of unconstitutionality could potentially
do more harm than good to the greater goals of understanding female
sexuality and providing sexual realization and autonomy. Those goals will
be best served, as they have been thus far, via legislative means and further
scientific research into the role and nature of sex and orgasm in modern
relationships. Part II provides a background discussion of the history of
sexual devices, specifically vibrators,8 and the laws that criminalize their
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27455136 (“Just when you thought it was safe to focus on the
issues in this historic election season . . . .”).
2
Id.
3
Babeland Blog, Babeland Rocks the Vote with Free Sex Toys, http://blog.babeland.com/
2008/11/03/babeland-rocks-the-vote-with-free-sex-toys (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
4
Id.
5
See Babeland Blog, Update on the Free Sex Toys, http://blog.babeland.com/2008/
11/05/update-on-the-free-sex-toys (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
6
Id.
7
Stuckey, supra note 1.
8
Vibrators are highlighted as an example because they are more effective, more
innocuous, and have a shorter history than most sexual devices. The choice is appropriate
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sale in some states. Part III discusses the case history and decisions of the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle9 and
Williams v. King,10 respectively. Part IV provides background to the
constitutional challenges, discussion of the existing and potential academic
criticisms of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, and analysis of those
criticisms. Part V contains concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. HYSTERIA, MASSAGE, & VIBRATORS

Derived from a Greek word meaning “womb,”11 “hysteria” as a
diagnosis dates back to as early as 2000 B.C.E., and documented treatment
by “vulvular massage” dates to at least the first century C.E.12 Symptoms
of hysteria, described in the seventeenth century as “the most common of
all diseases except fevers,”13 include anxiety, sleeplessness, irritability,
erotic fantasy, and vaginal lubrication—a set of symptoms some call
“chronic arousal.”14 Vulvular massage would temporarily treat hysterical
women by leading to paroxysms, or sudden outbursts of emotion or
action.15 Hysterical paroxysms are characterized by, among other things,
“local spasms,” loss of consciousness, flushing of the skin, “voluptuous
sensations,” embarrassment, confusion, and a very brief loss of control; in
short, paroxyms are orgasms. 16

given that the relevant discussion is properly focused around the role of orgasm rather than
the means of achieving it. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. Furthermore, that even
vibrators are not constitutionally protected demands the corresponding conclusion that more
prurient devices are not. Cf. infra note 271 and accompanying text.
9
517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
10
478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 814 (2007).
11
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).
[hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY].
12
See generally RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM: “HYSTERIA,” THE
VIBRATOR, AND WOMEN’S SEXUAL SATISFACTION (1999) (detailing the history and
medicalization of the female orgasm). Hysteria, a supposed revolt of the uterus against
neglect that “combines in its connotation the pejorative elements of femininity and the
irrational,” has also been called “womb disease,” “suffocation of the mother,” “uterine
congestion,” “pelvic inflammation,” “hysteroneurasthenia,” and “frigidity.” Id. at 21.
13
JOSEPH FRANK PAYNE, THOMAS SYDENHAM 143 (1900).
14
MAINES, supra note 12, at 8.
15
Id. at 4; AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY; supra note 11.
16
MAINES, supra note 12, at 23, 26-34 (describing historical causes and treatments of
hysteria and awareness of the orgasmic nature of paroxysms). That hysterics, unlike
epileptics, felt better after their spells and at no point became incontinent raised suspicions
of malingering. Id. at 8.
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Because “hysterical” women were not achieving orgasm by
penetration and masturbation was strictly proscribed, medical treatment was
necessary.17 Furthermore, because it was a treatment rather than a cure, the
task of vulvular massage had to be regularly repeated. Physicians found the
treatment to be an inconvenient, routine, and difficult-to-learn chore,18 often
leading them to relegate the labor to husbands and midwives.19 That the
business was lucrative, regular, and repeat, but also annoying, provided
ample incentive for inventive minds.20 In the 1880s, Dr. Joseph Mortimer
Granville developed and patented the electromechanical vibrator,21
revolutionizing treatment of hysteria.22
By 1952, the American Psychiatric Association officially removed
hysteria and other related disorders from the list of accepted diagnoses.23
The vibrator, however, fell from grace almost three decades earlier.24 Prior
to the late 1920s, the vibrator held an odd social position, a welcomed
medical innovation separate from similar but more risky technologies like
the speculum.25
A confluence of amenable social, medical, and
17

See id. at 3; see also ANNE KOEDT, THE MYTH OF THE VAGINAL ORGASM (1970),
available at http://www.cwluherstory.com/myth-of-the-vaginal-orgasm.html.
18
One doctor, in 1660, described the technique as “not unlike that children’s game in
which they try to rub their stomachs with one hand and pat their heads with the other.”
NATHANIEL HIGHMORE, DE PASSIONE HYSTERICA ET DE AFFECTIONE HYPOCHONDRIACA 76-77
(1660) (“Necnon in lusu illo puerorum, quo una manu pectus perfricare, altera frontem
percutere conantur.”).
19
See MAINES, supra note 12, at 4.
20
Cf. id. at 4, 67-110 (detailing the various methods of electrical, hydraulic, and
mechanical manipulation brought to bear on the matter).
21
See Rachel Maines, Socially Camouflaged Technologies: The Case of the
Electromechanical Vibrator, in WOMEN, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY: A READER IN FEMINIST
SCIENCE STUDIES 223, 225 (Mary Wyer ed., New York 2001).
22
See MAINES, supra note 12, at 11 (noting the invention is less fatiguing and required
less skill than manual massage, less expensive than hydriatic or steam-powered technologies,
and more reliable, portable, and decentralizing than other physical therapies). The vibrator’s
invention also heralded a brief medical craze of treating all manner of ailments with
“[u]ndulatory . . . [t]herapeutics.” See id. at 97-99. The Food and Drug Administration
regulates vibrators “for therapeutic use.” 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5940 & 5960 (2009).
23
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, MENTAL DISORDERS DIAGNOSTIC MANUAL
(1952).
24
See MAINES, supra note 12, at 20.
25
See id. at 58 (“Any object or device that traveled the path of the totemic penis into the
vagina was . . . suspected of having an orgasmically stimulating effect.”); ROBERT
BRUDENELL CARTER, ON THE PATHOLOGY AND TREATMENT OF HYSTERIA 69 (London, 1853)
(noting the “remedy is worse than the disease. . . . [Y]oung[,] unmarried women . . . [are]
reduced by the constant use of the speculum to the mental and moral condition of
prostitutes . . . asking every medical practitioner . . . to institute an examination of the sexual
organs”); cf. Joan P. Emerson, Behavior in Private Places: Sustaining Definitions of Reality
in Gynecological Examinations, 2 RECENT SOC. 74 (1970) (discussing the tension between
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psychological theories in that era cast the vibrator in an artificially reputable
light.26 Dominant androcentrism27 implied that “what pleases men sexually
pleases women generally.”28 Women incapable of achieving strictly
vaginal orgasms (by most accounts, a majority)29 were in need of therapy.30
Profound lack of understanding, both physiological and psychological, of
female sexuality led to confusion about the role of female sex organs and
the function, if any, of female orgasm.31 Much of this confusion continues
to this day.32 Androcentrism “created” hysterical women, and their
“treatment” through massage rather than penetration was viewed as clinical
rather than sexual.33 The only real hurdle for the vibrator to clear en route
to routine acceptance was the concern that massage without the assistance
of a physician would lead to “compulsive masturbation, nymphomania, or

the clinical and the sexual in gynecological exams and detailing the means of enforcing
clinical perceptions, including norms against “threatening events” such as eye contact, casual
conversation, and being either too modest or immodest).
26
Hysteria was thought to have its source in women’s envy of men and failure to accept
their role as women, and so it was regarded as an anti-male phenomenon. See Koedt, supra
note 17 (explaining that this envy stemmed from women’s “inferior appendage”).
27
See MAINES, supra note 12, at 112 (defining “the androcentric paradigm of sexuality”
as the idea that “sex consists of penetration (usually of the vagina) to male orgasm”).
28
Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One’s Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After
Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 23 (2004).
29
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
30
FRANK S. CAPRIO, THE SEXUALLY ADEQUATE FEMALE 64 (1953) (stating that any
woman that “is incapable of achieving orgasm via coitus” or “prefers clitoral stimulation”
should be regarded as “suffering from frigidity and requir[ing] . . . assistance”).
31
See Jane Gerhard, Revisiting “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm”: The Female Orgasm
in American Sexual Thought and Second Wave Feminism, 26 FEMINIST STUD. 449, 451-52
(2000) (“[M]edical experts had long debated . . . whether women required orgasm to be
fertile[,] if orgasm . . . [was] a crucial element of a woman’s physical and mental wellbeing[,] the social ramifications of ‘excessive’ female desire, [and] the role the clitoris
should or could play in healthy female sexuality. . . . Early nineteenth-century anatomy
textbooks noted the existence of the clitoris but believed that . . . [it] was passive and
unimportant . . . . By the twentieth century, most . . . did not label the clitoris or discuss its
function.”). Contra Koedt, supra note 17 (arguing that there was pervasive medical and
common knowledge of the existence and importance of the clitoris and clitoral stimulation).
32
See ELISABETH A. LLOYD, THE CASE OF THE FEMALE ORGASM (2005) (analyzing
twenty-one evolutionary accounts of female orgasm and finding that the only plausible
explanation is as a byproduct of male orgasm and shared embryonic tissue, a “happy
accident”). Recent research continues to challenge common and near universal “knowledge”
regarding women’s sexuality, often finding that knowledge both untested and wrong. See,
e.g., Andrea Virginia Burri et al., Genetic and Environmental Influences on Self-Reported GSpots in Women: A Twin Study, 7 J. SEXUAL MED. 1842 (2010).
33
Cf. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 267-68 (1992)
(“[S]ocial relations enforced by the body politic often find . . . justification in the
organization of the female body itself.”).
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an outright rejection of intercourse.”34 The advantages of cost and
convenience would quickly overcome such objections.35
Before the late 1920s, advertisements for vibrators, marketed to both
women and their husbands, appeared in publications as commonplace as
Home Needlework Magazine, Hearst’s, Popular Mechanics, McClure’s,
and Sears and Roebuck.36 Advertisements made claims of prolonging
youth, health, and beauty, one of the most explicit claiming that “[a]ll the
keen relish, the pleasures of youth, will throb within you.”37 Vibrators were
marketed as regular household appliances; indeed, the only mechanical
census that mentions their sales specifically classifies them with curling
irons and hair driers.38 Vibrators were one of the first five appliances to be
electrified, possibly reflecting consumer interest and priority.39 However,
social, medical, and psychological paradigm shifts quickly spelled the end
of the vibrator in the public sphere.
In the late 1920s, the vibrator began appearing in pornographic films
as a masturbatory device, exposing it as a threat to the androcentric model.40
At the same time, Freud’s psychoanalytic theories of “mature” (vaginal)
versus “immature” (clitoral) female sexuality, originally penned in 1905,
had become developed and dominant.41 Freud’s account both entrenched
the androcentric model and exposed the problem vibrators posed to it.
These events corresponded with the growing awareness in the medical

34

See Gerhard, supra note 31, at 452.
See MAINES, supra note 12, at 100.
36
See id. at 19-20, 100-08 (listing publications advertising various vibrator technologies
including the electromechanical vibrator); Maines, supra note 21, at 228-31 (presenting a
similar, but not identical list).
37
See Maines, supra note 21, at 228-31.
38
See id. at 231.
39
See MAINES, supra note 12, at 100 (noting the electrification of the vibrator preceded
appliances such as the vacuum cleaner and iron).
40
See id. at 20; MAINES, supra note 21, at 223 (noting that appearances of vibrators in
stag films “may have rendered the camouflage inadequate”).
41
See MAINES, supra note 12, at 43-45 (discussing Freud’s Aetiology of Hysteria—which
finds hysteria’s origin in “juvenile exposures to sexuality”—and its ascendancy to dominant
paradigm in the late 1920s); Gerhard, supra note 31, at 452-59 (discussing Freud’s theory of
the primary importance of vaginal orgasm being linked to men and its development from the
1930s to the 1960s by Deutsch, Hitschmann & Bergler, and Farnham & Lundberg).
Astonishingly, dedication to the assumptions of Freud’s model was so deep that some
researchers even suggested “treating” women by surgically transplanting the clitoris closer to
the vagina. See MARIE BONAPARTE, FEMALE SEXUALITY 148 (1953).
35
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community that hysteria was so overbroad as a category as to be a
meaningless diagnosis.42
By 1930, the vibrator had disappeared from commercial catalogues
entirely. It remained underground until its resurgence as a non-medical
device in 1960s catalogues.43 Since then, the “adult novelty” market has
ballooned into a $1.5 billion industry.44 In the meantime, second wave
feminism had begun to dismantle Freudian androcentrism and opened the
door for clitoral orgasm to re-enter healthy relationships.45 However, the
debate over the role and importance of female orgasm in modern
relationships certainly has not been won,46 as evidenced by the recent and
continued attempts by certain state legislatures to regulate the means by
which women achieve climax.47 The early twentieth-century association of
the vibrator with pornography brought about its temporary demise. Yet,
removing it from respectable roles and relegating it to seedy sex shops also
sheltered it from explicit state sanction. Ironically, the vibrator’s latetwentieth-century revival, which brought it out from backrooms and
basements and into national retailers and well-known boutiques,48 has
hastened its prohibition.
B. STATE REGULATION OF SEXUAL DEVICES

The 1980s and ’90s saw several states enact laws prohibiting the
distribution of sexual devices. Though as many as eight states once had
statutes banning sales,49 at present the number of undisputed statutes has
42

See MAINES, supra note 12, at 34 (noting the fracture of hysteria into three related
“diseases” and the disagreement within the medical community whether sexual indulgence
and masturbation were symptoms or causes of the conditions).
43
Id. at 20.
44
See Lessley Anderson, A Sex Toy Story, CNNMONEY.COM, June 1, 2006,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/2006/05/01/8375938/index.htm.
45
See Gerhard, supra note 31, at 459-68 (explaining Koedt’s and others’ incorporation of
work by sexologists like Kinsey et al. and Masters & Johnson into a feminist critique of the
Freudian model).
46
See MAINES, supra note 12, at 112 (“What is impressive, however, is that the
androcentric paradigm of sexuality . . . is a fixed point in the otherwise shifting sands of
Western medical opinion.”).
47
See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
48
See, e.g., Kristin Fasullo, Beyond Lawrence v. Texas: Crafting a Fundamental Right to
Sexual Privacy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2997, 3013-16 (2009) (detailing the popularity of
devices, including attention from Oprah Winfrey as well as offerings from retailers like
Amazon.com, Walmart, and Target).
49
See infra note 50. But see Danielle J. Lindemann, Pathology Full Circle: A History of
Anti-Vibrator Legislation in the United States, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326, 330 (2006)
(noting that the number of states with statutes that prohibit the sale of sexual devices is
“almost impossible to assess accurately at any one time, due to spotty enforcement and the
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dwindled to three.50 The stories emerging from the states with invalidated
laws are relatively consistent: the invalidity of each law stems from
constitutional technicalities, while the underlying ability to regulate the sale
of these devices is either never addressed or simply presumed to exist.51
The Colorado statute, for example, contained a blanket proscription of
all sexual devices.52 The Colorado Supreme Court held that, because it
lacked a medical exception, the statute infringed the privacy right of those
seeking “legitimate” use.53 The Kansas statute also failed to create a
medical exception, again leading to invalidation on privacy grounds.54 In a
related but distinct analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that
because the Louisiana statute contained no medical exception, it failed
rational basis review.55 The Georgia statute contained a blanket ban on
advertising despite providing a medical exception for sale.56 The state’s
supreme court held that because this amounted to a per se ban on

fact that these laws are continually in flux”). Some estimates are as high as fourteen. Id. at
330-31. Virginia’s statute appears to be one that is unenforced. Cf. Allison Klein, In Old
Town, the Sex Shop Is a Kiss-Off, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2009, at A1 (suggesting “[t]he city
cannot act because the store is complying with the law” despite the fact that the store
markets and sells sexual devices).
50
See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (1975 & Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7101 (Supp. 1984), invalidated by People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax,
Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80 (2003), invalidated by This
That & The Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, 439 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2006);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (2003), invalidated by State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023 (Kan.
1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1 (2003), invalidated by State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64
(La. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (2000); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21 & 43.23
(Vernon 2003), invalidated by Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir.
2008), reh’g en banc denied, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. 18.2-373(3)
(2000). At least one municipality had a similar statute. See ST. LOUIS REV. CODE
§ 11.54.010 (2008), invalidated by Postscript Enter. v. Whaley, 658 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir.
1981).
51
See, e.g., Postscript Enter., 658 F.2d at 1254 n.6 (“We assume, without having to
decide, that the City of St. Louis may, through a properly drawn ordinance, restrict the sale
of items which enable, aid, or encourage private consensual sexual behavior among adults.”).
52
See Tooley, 697 P.2d at 370.
53
Id. (noting that FDA regulations implied legitimate therapeutic use and that the statute
as written “equate[s] sex with obscenity,” but declining to reach whether there is a broader
constitutional privacy interest violated by the statute).
54
See Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031 (citing to and agreeing with Tooley, [but noting that the
statute permissibly defined “obscene” beyond community standards because Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), does not apply to devices).
55
See Brenan, 772 So. 2d at 74 (noting that the Miller test does not necessarily apply to
devices, but applying the Miller test to find devices not always obscene, thereby eliminating
any state interest that could surpass therapeutic interest under rational basis review).
56
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80 (2003), invalidated by This That & The Other Gift &
Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, 439 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2006).
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advertising, the statute violated the First Amendment.57 In the end, there is
no clear trend in exactly to what these statutes object or what or whom they
are designed to protect. The statutory language variously focuses on
function, form, or both. The lack of uniformity becomes particularly clear
when one considers regulation going forward. For example, it is thoroughly
confounding to consider how (or even if) state legislatures will respond to
devices such as Dr. Stuart Meloy’s Orgasmatron, which is nothing more
than electrodes and a box, designed to directly stimulate the spinal cord
rather than the genitals.58
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: WILLIAMS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL

Williams v. Pryor,59 in 1999, was the first step in a fairly complex case
history that spans eight years and two attorneys general, involving three
separate trial court hearings, two reversals and remands, and two denials of
rehearing.60 Both users and vendors challenged Alabama’s obscene
materials statute, amended in 1998 to prohibit the sale of devices primarily
for the stimulation of human genital organs.61 The challenge did not seek
recognition of a fundamental right; rather, it claimed the statute burdened
and violated rights to privacy and personal autonomy derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment and bore no rational relationship to proper
legislative purpose.62 The district court found that the plaintiffs’ interests
did not warrant strict scrutiny, but held that the statute did not even pass
rational basis review.63 Specifically, the court found that, although the
state’s conceivable interests (banning public displays of obscene materials,
banning the commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism for its own
57
See This That & The Other, 439 F.3d at 1284-85 (suggesting that the state’s failure to
argue a limiting construction of the statute, rather than an inherent flaw in the law, mandated
invalidation of the entire statute).
58
See Regina Nuzzo, Call Him Doctor “Orgasmatron”, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008,
http://www.latimes.com/features/health/la-he-orside11feb11,1,7473561.story.
59
Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999), rev’d, 240 F.3d
944 (11th Cir. 2001).
60
Some of this complexity stems from the fact that the complaint originated prior to, but
terminated after, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See, e.g., Williams I, at 1279, 1282-83 (referencing Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977), for the proposition that the Court has not
decided whether states can regulate sexual behavior among adults).
61
See Williams I, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257; ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (1975 & Supp.
2003).
62
See Williams I, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1260, 1275.
63
Id. at 1283-84, 1287-93.
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sake, and banning commerce in obscene material) were all legitimate, the
statute was overbroad in achieving those interests.64
The Eleventh Circuit reversed on appeal, finding that the district court
did not apply sufficient deference in its rational basis analysis.65
Specifically, the panel found the state’s interest in regulating public
morality by discouraging autonomous sex was served, if only
incrementally, by a complete ban on commerce in devices for autonomous
use.66 The panel also found that the district court misapplied three
important Supreme Court precedents regarding levels of scrutiny.67
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held that, regardless of how misguided the
Alabama legislature may have been, the statute still survives rational basis
review.68
However, after affirming the district court’s decision that the facial
challenge on fundamental rights grounds was inadequate, the Eleventh
Circuit remanded the as-applied challenge.69 On remand, the district court,
in contradiction to its finding in Williams I, found that states traditionally
refrained from regulating the private sexual behavior of both married and
unmarried couples.70 The court charted a history from “open spaces and
free expression” prior to the seventeenth century,71 through Puritan control
of sexual conduct,72 the demise of church influence and the rise of family
and neighborhood enforcement in the eighteenth century,73 the advent of
Victorian prudism in the nineteenth century, into the Comstock Act and the

64

Id. at 1285-87, 1288-93 (finding that commerce in sexual devices does not require
public display, that such devices are often used within marriages and relationships rather
than for auto-eroticism, and that many such devices are not obscene).
65
Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001).
66
Id. at 949-50 (noting that the legislation might even survive intermediate scrutiny but
not addressing that question).
67
Id. at 950-52 (noting that the standard for overbreadth derived from Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987), is specific to prison regulations; that Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), was not based on rational basis review; and that decisions addressing prejudicial
classification under equal protection are inappropriate when applied to a case involving
neither classification nor equal protection).
68
Id. at 952 (“The Constitution presumes that . . . improvident decisions will eventually
be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted
no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.”).
69
Id. at 955-56 (criticizing the trial court for failing to undertake a Glucksberg analysis
of “deeply rooted” and “central liberty” with regard to the user plaintiffs).
70
Williams v. Pryor (Williams III), 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (mem.)
(taking plaintiff’s presented history as correct because of the state’s concession of the point).
71
Id. at 1278-80 (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1990)).
72
Id. (noting the Puritans’ distinction between “proper sexual expression” within
marriage and “sexual transgression” outside of marriage).
73
Id. at 1280-82 (noting a “gradual although irregular decline in sexual oppression”).
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invention of the electromechanical vibrator,74 and finishing with the sexual
revolution and the re-emergence of substantive due process in the twentieth
century.75 At all times throughout this history, married couples enjoyed
sexual freedom, either through the lack of statutes or non-enforcement of
existing statutes. At later points in this history, that freedom was extended
to unmarried couples, leading the district court to conclude that there is an
“established pattern of non-interference with virtually all consenting adult
sexual behavior.”76 Having effectively announced a fundamental right to
sexual privacy, the district court went on to find the statute was not
narrowly tailored enough to meet a compelling state interest.77
Between the time of the decision of Williams III and its hearing on
appeal,78 the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas.79 The Eleventh Circuit read the ambiguous Lawrence opinion very
narrowly, characterizing any hints at a fundamental right as “scattered
dicta.”80 The court therefore relied heavily on prior jurisprudence, noting
that past protections of personal autonomy “[do] not warrant the sweeping
conclusion that any and all important, intimate decisions are so protected,”
and found no Supreme Court precedent for recognizing a free-standing right
to sexual privacy.81 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, the Court has
seen repeated opportunities to recognize such a right and has invariably
declined.82
The Eleventh Circuit then performed its own Glucksberg analysis for
declaring a new fundamental right.83 Despite having framed the right at
issue in Williams I as “an individual’s liberty to use sexual devices when
engaging in lawful, private, sexual activity,”84 the district court had
abandoned this “careful formulation” of the right in favor of the overbroad
74

Id. at 1282-89 (acknowledging the Comstock laws as an aberration of the era, and
assuming the exception of vibrators from Comstock laws was evidence of “legislative
respect for sexual privacy in the marital relationship”).
75
Id. at 1289-94 (taking as a sign of the times, inter alia, the fact that the Model Penal
Code excepts deviate sexual intercourse between consenting adults from criminal sanction).
76
Id. at 1295.
77
Id. at 1303-07.
78
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
79
539 U.S. 558 (2003). Lawrence is discussed at length infra Parts IV.A.1-3.
80
Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1236-37.
81
Id. at 1235 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997)).
82
Id. at 1235-36 (noting that Lawrence did not apply fundamental rights analysis,
ultimately applying rational basis review).
83
Id. at 1239-50. The so-called “Glucksberg Two-Step” requires a “careful description”
of the asserted liberty interest and inquires whether a right or liberty is objectively “deeply
rooted in the nation’s history and traditions.” See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. The
Glucksberg analysis is discussed infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
84
Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2001).
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“right to sexual privacy.”85 The circuit court warned that such a
formulation, with no defined scope or bounds save for confinement to
consenting adults, would encompass activities like prostitution, obscenity,
and adult incest.86 Instead, the circuit chose to reframe the right, in line
with the formulation it originally accepted in Williams II, as one to sell,
purchase, and use sexual devices.87
Turning to the historical analysis required by the second prong of
Glucksberg, the circuit court found four errors in the district court’s inquiry.
First, the district court’s misframing of the right at issue as one of “sexual
privacy” led to an irrelevant exploration of the history of sex in America.88
Second, the district court, in its analysis of history and tradition, placed too
much emphasis on contemporary practices and attitudes.89 Third, the
district court incorrectly equated a history of non-interference with the
asserted right with a history of protection of that right.90 Finally, the district
court’s reliance solely on the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert and the
state’s putative concessions was flawed.91 The circuit court reversed the
district court’s ruling and remanded the case for consideration of the effect
of Lawrence’s overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick92 on the legitimacy of
regulating sexual morality.93
On this remand, the district court responded to the circuit court’s
repeated admonitions and found that, because the statute facially applies to
people of many lifestyles, it does not conflict with Lawrence’s invalidation

85

Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1239 & n.10 (remarking that such a mistake is understandable
given the imprecise language utilized in Williams II, 240 F.3d at 953).
86
Id. at 1239-40.
87
Id. at 1242 (acknowledging that the minimum, “careful” formulation is merely one of
selling and purchasing, but noting that the commercial burden is “tantamount to restrictions
on the use” and so requiring use analysis as well).
88
Id. at 1242-43 (noting that the correct inquiry would be one into the treatment of
sexual devices).
89
Id. at 1243-44 & n.14 (noting that Glucksberg’s reference to contemporary practice
was a non-essential confirmation of its historical finding of no deeply-rooted right rather
than, as here, a contradiction of it, and observing that the contemporary trend actually
“proves too much” by confirming the court’s deference to democratic process).
90
Id. at 1244-45 (noting that by finding a negative rather than affirmative protection, the
district court inverted the Glucksberg inquiry in a way that would support a fundamental
freedom to pollute, discriminate, and commit marital rape as well as give a perverse
incentive to legislatures to regulate all aspects of life).
91
Id. at 1246-50 (noting that the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony often amounts to bare and
biased assertion without independent verification, or statements in contradiction with the
expert’s previous academic works; also noting that the state did not, as the trial court claimed
and relied on, concede this historical treatment).
92
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
93
Williams IV, 378 F.3d. at 1250.
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of a statute based on its impact on homosexual lifestyles.94 On final appeal,
in by far the shortest opinion in this line of cases, the circuit court finally
affirmed, emphasizing that the statute here involved public, commercial
activity as opposed to Lawrence’s invalidation of prohibitions on a type of
private, non-commercial activity.95 The circuit court’s switch from
focusing on private use in Williams II and Williams IV to focusing on public
commerce in Williams VI can be explained by the change in relevant
question from the existence of a fundamental right to the existence of a
rational basis after Lawrence.96
The Williams saga ultimately focused on a proposed fundamental right
to use sexual devices in private sexual activity and the burden imposed on
that interest by regulating public commerce in those devices. The Williams
courts concluded that no such right exists and, therefore, that the state’s
commercial regulation easily passed rational basis review. The Fifth
Circuit would address the same questions concerning a substantially similar
statute exactly one year later.
B. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: RELIABLE CONSULTANTS, INC. V. EARLE

In Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle,97 the Fifth Circuit heard a
declaratory challenge on Fourteenth Amendment grounds to a Texas statute
that criminalized the buying, selling, advertising, giving, or lending of any
device designed or marketed for sexual stimulation.98 To begin, the court
noted the potential for several presumably non-prurient interests in sexual
devices, including situations where one partner is physically unable to
engage in intercourse or has a contagious disease, where the devices may be

94

See Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (noting
that none of the targeted devices represent implements common to the homosexual lifestyle,
nor does the law target a specific, identifiable class for discrimination or harm out of simple
hostility).
95
See Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007).
96
Compare Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1242 (“[O]ur analysis must be framed not simply in
terms of whether the Constitution protects a right to sell and buy sexual devices, but whether
it protects a right to use such devices.”) (emphasis added), with Williams VI, 478 F.3d at
1323 (“[W]e do not read Lawrence, the overruling of Bowers, or the Lawrence court’s
reliance on Justice Stevens’s dissent, to have rendered public morality altogether illegitimate
as a rational basis.”) (emphasis added).
97
517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
98
See id. at 740; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21, 43.23 (Vernon 2003), invalidated by
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008). The case also presented a
First Amendment challenge, but the court did not reach that issue because doing so was
unnecessary to invalidate the statute in this case and “it may be premature.” See Reliable
Consultants, 517 F.3d at 747.
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necessary for therapeutic needs, or where they facilitate the decision to
refrain from premarital intercourse.99
Next, the court turned its attention to the impact of Lawrence on its
substantive due process analysis.100 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth
Circuit found no need to formulate the right at stake as one involving either
the sale, purchase, or use of sexual devices.101 Indeed, the circuit court
determined that the Lawrence Court had already defined and defended the
right at stake: the right “to be free from governmental intrusion regarding
‘the most private of human contact, sexual behavior.’”102 Unlike the
Alabama statute, which merely prohibited commerce in such devices, the
Texas statute prohibited lending and giving, thereby eliminating arguments
that the statute affected only public, commercial conduct.103 The court
found that the state’s interest in public morality could not justify so
significant an intrusion into “adult consensual intimacy in the home.”104
Finally, the court found that the state’s interest in protecting minors and
unwilling adults from exposure to the devices and their advertisements is
not rationally connected to the statute, particularly since an unwilling
recipient would first have to affirmatively seek out the device in order to be
exposed to it.105
Writing in dissent, Judge Hawkins suggested that, rather than the
majority’s approach of sidestepping scrutiny, Lawrence demands a rational
basis standard of review.106 Chief Judge Jones’s later dissent from the
court’s denial of rehearing en banc expanded on that position, noting that
“the Reliable majority exploited [Lawrence’s] broad and vague statements
about liberty while ignoring the Court’s self-imposed limits” in a manner
that “trivializes that decision and ‘demeans the importance of its holding

99

Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 742.
Id. at 743-47 (finding that Lawrence majority rested entirely on substantive due
process grounds and applying the Lawrence analysis to the Texas statute).
101
Id. at 743.
102
Id. at 743-44 (finding substantial similarity—prohibition of a particular sexual act—
between the law in Bowers and the law here (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567
(2003))).
103
Id. at 744.
104
Id. at 745 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564). In a footnote, however, the court
observed that its holding “in no way overtly expresses or implies that public morality can
never be a constitutional justification for a law.” Id. at 564 n.36.
105
Id. at 746.
106
Id. at 749 (Hawkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100
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which deals a fatal blow to criminal laws aimed at punishing
homosexuals.’”107
Judge Garza’s separate dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc,
before questioning the Supreme Court’s method of announcing
unenumerated rights, criticized the Reliable majority for misunderstanding
the right announced in Lawrence and for extending that right far beyond its
limits in several ways.108 First, although the Reliable majority recognized
that the Lawrence Court did not announce a new fundamental right, by
ignoring levels of scrutiny, it created “something outside of substantive due
process jurisprudence entirely”: “a commercial right ex nihilo to promote
sexual devices.”109 Second, Judges Garza and Elrod (in separate dissents)
thought the Reliable majority overstepped its bounds by overruling a prior
statement of a circuit panel and a line of rulings by the Supreme Court.110
Specifically, the Reliable court overruled, sub silentio, the Fifth Circuit’s
prior precedent upholding the constitutionality of the same statute in Red
Bluff Drive Inn, Inc. v. Vance.111 Moreover, that precedent stemmed from a
direct line of Supreme Court cases permitting obscenity regulations, such as
Sewell v. Georgia,112 thereby placing the Reliable majority in violation of
the Court’s admonition that “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.”113

107

Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 356 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (Jones,
C.J., Jolly, Smith, Clement & Owen, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(quoting Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 819 (7th Cir. 2005) (Evans, J., concurring)).
108
Id. at 358 (Garza, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
109
Id. at 359.
110
Id. at 360 n.5; id. at 365 (Elrod, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(citing Lowry v. Texas A & M University System, 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997), for the
rule that a previous panel decision may only be overruled by “‘a subsequent decision of the
Supreme Court or by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc’”; noting also the creation of a circuit
split with the Eleventh and, arguably, Tenth Circuits).
111
Reliable Consultants, 538 F.3d at 360 n.5 (Garza, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
112
435 U.S. 982 (1978).
113
Id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989)); accord United States v. Harb, No. 2:07-CR-426 TS, 2009 WL 499467, at *2
(D. Utah Feb. 27, 2009) (declining to extend substantive due process right in Lawrence
beyond its facts, noting the Supreme Court must further interpret Lawrence before the lower
courts can overrule binding precedent).
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C. STATE COURTS

The Alabama statute, upheld by the Eleventh Circuit, withstood
another challenge, this time in front of the Alabama Supreme Court, on
both United States and Alabama constitutional claims.114 After lengthy
recitation and discussion of the Williams and Reliable courts’ positions, the
Alabama court adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Lawrence
wholesale.115 The Alabama court specifically emphasized the public/private
and commercial/noncommercial distinctions, as well as the lack of a
targeted class.116
Conversely, two Texas courts have balked at utilizing the Fifth
Circuit’s announcement of a fundamental right to sexual privacy.117 In
Varkonyi v. State,118 the defendant had been convicted of promotion or
possession of obscene materials with intent to promote.119 He claimed on
appeal that the state’s definition of “promote” criminalized his
constitutionally protected possession of obscene material in the privacy of
his own home.120 The appeals court noted that the opinion in Reliable did
not address the line of Supreme Court cases holding that the constitutionally
protected right to private possession of obscene material does not give rise
to a correlative right to receive those materials or sell or transmit them to
others.121 Though merely declining to extend the Reliable holding,122 the
appellate court did not distinguish in any detail the restrictions on
commerce in privately acceptable materials that are alternatively acceptable
and unacceptable based, ostensibly, on nothing more than whether the
material is a sexual device or merely “obscenity.”123
In Villarreal v. State,124 the defendant was convicted of violating
Texas’s statute banning distribution of sexual devices.125 The Texas
114
1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, No. 1070531, 2009 WL 2903458
(Ala. Sept. 11, 2009).
115
Id. at *22.
116
Id.
117
See Varkonyi v. State, 276 S.W.3d 27 (Tex. App. 2008) (declining to extend a
fundamental right to sexual privacy); Villarreal v. State, 276 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App. 2008)
(declining to follow the Fifth Circuit’s announcement of same).
118
276 S.W.3d at 27.
119
Id. at 37.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 38 (“We decline to follow Reliable Consultants because we do not read
Lawrence as overruling this line of authority.”).
123
One such distinction, for example, is that some obscene materials, like child
pornography, may necessarily harm others in their production.
124
276 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App. 2008).
125
Id. at 206.
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appeals court noted that it is not bound to follow the constitutional
pronouncements of federal circuit courts (including the Reliable decision),
but it is bound to follow the finding of constitutionality of its state courts.126
After noting several cases where Texas courts reluctantly applied the
statute, the Villarreal court declined to follow the Reliable majority.127 The
court quoted one appellate chief justice’s expression of frustration with his
constitutional constraints by stating: “Here we go raising the price of dildos
again. Since this appears to be the law in Texas[,] I must concur.”128
The limitations on the court in Villarreal will not be addressed any
time soon, as the Texas attorney general has declined to file a writ of
certiorari in Reliable.129 Until the Supreme Court further addresses sexual
privacy, Texas courts are bound to follow their state courts’ constitutional
precedents. Violators of the statute who receive prison sentences can access
the federal courts, which are bound by the Reliable decision, by writ of
habeas corpus.130 Whether Texas chooses to deal with this by repeal, nonenforcement, amendment, or strictly issuing fines is yet to be seen.131
The issue skirted in Varkonyi is even more troublesome. If, as the
Fifth Circuit contends, Lawrence eliminated morality as a stand-alone
rational basis, there is a direct conflict between this new jurisprudence and a
long line of the Court’s First Amendment doctrine. These issues demand
the attention of the Supreme Court.
IV. ANALYSIS
As of this writing, the academic response to the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuit lines of reasoning has universally embraced Reliable and rejected
Williams.132 These responses generally present theories of substantive due

126

Id. at 208-09 (agreeing with the Reliable court’s ruling but conforming to controlling
authority) (citing Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), and Ex parte
Dave, 220 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. App. 2007)).
127
Id. at 209.
128
Id. at 207 (quoting Regalado v. State, 872 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Tex. App. 1994) (Brown,
C.J., concurring)).
129
See Slav Kandyba, Texas AG Drops Adult Toy Case Appeal, XBIZ NEWS, Nov. 4,
2008, http://www.xbiz.com/news/101202.
130
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
131
If Texas’s reaction to Lawrence is any indication, repeal is not likely. The statute that
Lawrence declared unconstitutional is still on the books. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.06 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008).
132
See, e.g., Lindemann, supra note 49. The author excludes case notes that merely
characterize existing law, such as Douglas E. Nauman, Where Sexual Privacy Meets Public
Morality: How Williams v. King Is Instructive for the Fourth Circuit in Applying Public
Morality as a Legitimate State Interest After Lawrence v. Texas, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127
(2006).

572

Richard Glover

[Vol. 100

process, similar to the Fifth Circuit’s formulation in Reliable, that support a
fundamental right to sexual autonomy. Two other potential criticisms,
relying on equal protection and the First Amendment, have been hinted at in
the literature. This Part briefly outlines the doctrines of substantive due
process, equal protection, and free expression, presents the salient criticisms
and their shortcomings, and discusses hidden pitfalls in the fight for sexual
autonomy.
Part IV.A argues that, under substantive due process
jurisprudence, both the Fifth and Elevenths Circuits in Williams and
Reliable, respectively, likely got the outcome, if not the analysis or remedy,
correct. The difference in outcome between the two courts can easily be
ascribed to the fact that the Texas statute burdens use in a way that the
Alabama statute does not. Part IV.B argues that, though the anti-sexual
device statutes have a disparate and detrimental impact on women and
sexual minorities, current equal protection doctrine cannot vindicate their
rights, nor should it without further research. Finally, Part IV.C argues that,
while the Court’s language in Lawrence is vague enough to provide some
indication of a link between free speech and sexual expression, that link is
far too tenuous to affect the outcome of these cases.
A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution prohibit the
federal and state governments, respectively, from “depriv[ing] any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”133 Until the late
nineteenth century, the Court acknowledged only a procedural dimension to
due process, guaranteeing fundamental fairness. Gradually, the Court
began to acknowledge that due process has at least a minimal substantive
end as well: the requirement that the government act by means of valid
laws.134 This early formulation of substantive due process sought to
delineate some independent boundaries of government power and, as such,
rested as much on agency as due process.135 Lochner-era Courts, often
focused on redistributive economic policies as much as the bounds of the
police power, identified the boundaries generally with the concept that

133

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1332-33 (3d ed. 2000)
(“[B]y 1868, a recognized meaning of the qualifying phrase ‘of law’ was substantive.”). But
see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980) (calling substantive due process
an oxymoronic contradiction in terms akin to “green pastel redness”); Kermit Roosevelt III,
Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 984
(2006) (calling the formulation a pleonasm).
135
Roosevelt, supra note 134, at 984.
134
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“governmental action must serve a public purpose [or] interest, rather than
benefiting (or burdening) a discrete segment of the population.”136
This early era and its acknowledgement of a substantive component of
due process ended abruptly in the late 1930s.137 What survived was the
basic concept that the benefits of a law should exceed its burdens.138 The
Court began to defer to the legislature’s competence in identifying the
boundaries of those benefits and burdens, except instances in which the
legislature could not be trusted to do so because political checks would not
ensure adequate representation of the public’s interests.139 Hence, in 1938,
the Court, in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,140 set out the specific
boundary where the Court will question the government’s otherwise
constitutional actions: when those actions burden the rights of the accused,
the political process, or the rights of “discrete and insular minorities.”141
The Court later began protecting fundamental rights that are not explicitly
in the text of the Constitution,142 but are part of a shared American
tradition143 and essential to the concept of liberty.144 These include the right
“to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s
children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, . . . to
abortion[,] to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment[,]”145 and to
engage in adult, consensual sodomy in the privacy of one’s home.146 If the

136

Id. at 986-87.
See id. at 988-89 (suggesting that substantive due process collapsed under the weight
of the economic turmoil of the 1930s and the realization that identifying partial state
interventions in the market was impossible).
138
Id. at 992.
139
Id.
140
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
141
See id. at 153 n.4. That Carolene Products became the foundation of the Equal
Protection Clause doctrine rather than substantive due process is a remnant of the Court’s
attempt in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), to reverse incorporate the Equal
Protection Clause into Fifth Amendment due process. See Roosevelt, supra note 134, at
997-98. This move has been characterized as “‘gibberish both syntactically and
historically’” because it would make the Fourteenth Amendment’s separate guarantees of
equal protection and due process redundant as well as force a text from 1791 to
“incorporate” a text from 1868. Id. (quoting ELY, supra note 134, at 32).
142
See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
143
See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
144
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937).
145
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted).
146
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). A common misconception is that these
rights are decidedly liberal in nature. For criticisms of that view, see Bradley P. Jacob,
Griswold and the Defense of Traditional Marriage, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1199, 1213 (2007)
(“[J]ust about everyone, regardless of political perspective, can identify some rights that
137
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Court finds that a fundamental right is burdened by a statute, it will apply a
strict scrutiny review, which is generally fatal to the statute.147 Strict
scrutiny requires that the statute be a narrowly tailored, least restrictive
means of achieving a compelling government interest.148 If the Court finds
no fundamental right, it will apply a rational basis review, which is
generally not fatal to the statute,149 requiring only that the statute be
rationally related150 to a legitimate government interest.151
The protection of unenumerated rights remains controversial. Because
those rights and liberties are found outside the plain text of the Constitution,
critics are skeptical of the legitimacy of the rights and the Court’s ability to
identify them.152 The concern is that “‘liberty’ . . . can be read in diverse
ways, and there is no particular reason to trust judicial readings, even or
perhaps especially if they are morally infused.”153 The Court has openly
acknowledged and shared the concern that, without strict limitation,
fundamental rights will merely reflect the “predilections” of the current
members of the Court.154 The Court has addressed this concern with an

seem so incredibly important as to require judicial application.”); Mark Tushnet, Can You
Watch Unenumerated Rights Drift?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 209 (2006).
147
See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). Contra Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006)
(surveying every strict scrutiny decision published by the district, circuit, and Supreme
Courts from 1990 to 2003 and finding that strict scrutiny is not nearly as fatal as generally
believed, with laws surviving more than thirty percent of challenges).
148
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bost. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
149
See Gunther, supra note 147, at 8 (“[M]inimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact.”).
150
See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (stating that
legislation will be upheld under rational basis review “if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis” and “where there are ‘plausible reasons’ for
Congress’ action, ‘our inquiry is at an end’” (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 179 (1980))); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)
(“[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims . . . . It is enough
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
151
See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) (noting that rational
basis review requires “legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means”).
152
See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 134, at 993.
153
Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543, 1567-68
(2008).
154
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality) (citing
Lochner-era economic due process as exemplary of the pitfalls of judge-made rights, but
noting that history “counsels caution and restraint[,] . . . [not] abandonment”); see also id. at
544 (White, J., dissenting) (“The Judiciary . . . comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
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institutional reluctance to announce substantive due process rights155 and an
analytic method that requires both a “careful description” of the
fundamental right,156 and that the right be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition”157 and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”158
The Court has, at times, taken a more moderate approach of “reasoned
judgment,” identifying rights and balancing them against competing state
interests through philosophical analysis and political-moral reasoning.159
Lawrence v. Texas added a new wrinkle by noting that the historical inquiry
is merely a starting point of the analysis and is not necessarily dispositive
on its own.160 In one interpretation, the Lawrence Court based its decision
on “evolving national values.”161 Which method is deployed in any given
case appears to be unpredictable.162 However, because Lawrence is the
most recent case on point, it will be the focus of this analysis.
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
even the design of the Constitution.”).
155
See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“[T]he Court has
always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts
for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended [and so the
Court] exercise[s] the utmost care whenever . . . asked to break new ground in this field.”).
156
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). This “careful statement” has sometimes
been characterized as requiring definition of the right at “the most specific level at which a
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989). The careful statement requirement
has been criticized as allowing courts to pick and choose between competing accurate
descriptions of the activity involved based on the desired outcome of the case. See, e.g.,
Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1490 (2008).
157
Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
158
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937); see also Robert C. Post,
Foreward: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 89 (2003) (describing this “approach as “focus[ing] on the forms of liberty
prerequisite for personal dignity and autonomy”). For a general discussion of fundamental
inadequacies of the focus on history and tradition, see Sunstein, supra note 153.
159
See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV.
63, 98-106 (2006) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992)).
160
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003); cf. Herald, supra note 28, at 30
(“Rather than attack the standard directly as one easily manipulated, Kennedy simply
manipulates the standard, deftly showing by example the dangerous plasticity of the tradition
and history doctrine.”).
161
See Conkle, supra note 159 at 115-33; Michael J. Hooi, Substantive Due Process: Sex
Toys After Lawrence, 60 FLA. L. REV. 507, 509-10 (2008). For general discussions of the
impact of Lawrence on substantive due process, see H.N. HIRSCH, THE FUTURE OF GAY
RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2005).
162
See Deana Pollard Sacks, Elements of Liberty, 61 SMU L. REV. 1557, 1560-61 (2008)
(“To this end, the Court has constructed various interpretive methods, which are then
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1. Scrutinizing Lawrence
The Lawrence decision has been characterized as a “maddening,”163
“remarkably opaque” opinion that “raises a number of puzzles”;164 one that
is “easy to read, but difficult to pin down”;165 and as notable for what it
failed to say as for what it actually did say.166 Because the opinion in
Lawrence did not carefully describe a fundamental liberty interest,167 nor
specify a level of scrutiny,168 many have debated its actual method and
meaning.169 Some read Lawrence as applying rational basis review to
invalidate the law,170 which merely complicates similar issues by never
reaching and answering the question of fundamental rights.171 Others
suggest that the Court applied a form of strict scrutiny.172 Still others argue
that the Court applied a balancing test that is neither strict nor rational.173

engaged irregularly or simply discarded.” (citing, inter alia, the penumbra approach to
privacy as being discarded less than a decade after its announcement)).
163
Michael P. Allen, The Underappreciated First Amendment Importance of Lawrence
v. Texas, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2008).
164
Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 29, 45 (2003).
165
Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (2004); see also
Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75 (2003)
(noting that, because the “lack of clarity concerning antecedents in the opinion goes beyond
the merely grammatical,” the language and reasoning “frequently point in a direction” that,
upon review, “reverses itself or dissolves into ambiguity”); Herald, supra note 28, at 29
(“The opinion has language that gives and then takes, sometimes in the same sentence.”).
166
See Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence’s Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1180 (2004)
(calling Lawrence “poor judicial craftsmanship” and noting “[i]ts reasoning is obscure, and it
lays down no clear rule”); see also Herald, supra note 28, at 32 n.212 (suggesting that the
Lawrence doctrine parallels the discarded obscenity doctrine of “I know it when I see it”).
But cf. Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 746
(2010) (arguing that, after Lawrence, what was once haphazardly protected under privacy
has now correctly shifted to protection under liberty, with either negative repercussions for
the use of sexual devices if pursued under privacy or trivializing consequences for gay rights
if pursued under liberty); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV.
1447, 1449 (2004) (“Like Loving, Lawrence marks a crystallization of doctrine.”).
167
See Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 n.6 (11th Cir.
2004) (“Rather, the constitutional liberty interests on which the Court relied were invoked,
not with ‘careful description,’ but with sweeping generality.”).
168
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169
See Herald, supra note 28, at 30 (“Lawrence was not written to praise liberty, but to
bury Bowers. . . . Thus, although it is clear that Bowers is dead, it is unclear what doctrine
lives on.”).
170
See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51 n.5 (1st Cir. 2008).
171
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172
See Cook, 528 F.3d at 51 n.6.
173
See id. at 51 n.7.
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At least one scholar even suggests that Lawrence was as much about
procedure as substance.174
As the circuit split in Reliable and Williams clearly demonstrates,
Lawrence is a blunt enough instrument to be both the right and wrong tool
for the job:
By its language, the opinion’s protection seems to be limited to (1) consensual acts,
(2) involving adult humans, (3) in private, who are engaged in (4) safe, (5) sodomy
that (6) does not bear the affirmative sanction of the government. The use of vibrators
175
and other sex aids meets most of these criteria.

Specifically, statutes concerning sexual devices legislate situations involves
the use by (1) at least one consenting (2) adult (3) acting in private, of an
aid that is (4) safe, and (6) no affirmative government sanction is sought.176
The value of this juxtaposition turns on two fundamental assumptions:
burdening commerce in an item is the same as prohibiting its use and the
Lawrence decision’s protection is not predicated on the act of sodomy.
The first assumption seems easy enough to prove, but not from
Lawrence. Lawrence protects against at least some laws directed at private
action as a means of discouraging public conduct. The issue in Reliable
and Williams involves prohibition of public conduct to discourage private
action; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey177
controls. Casey clearly indicates that burdening the access to a product is
essentially identical to proscribing its use, a fact that both the Williams and
Reliable courts recognized.178 The question, then, becomes whether the
state can proscribe use, which, in turn, rests on the second assumption
concerning the extent of Lawrence’s protection.
What Lawrence protects is dependent on, and so is as muddled as, the
means by which the Court reached its decision. The Court never uses the
phrase “fundamental right,”179 but it does use “legitimate state interest,”180

174

Sunstein, supra note 164, at 28.
Herald, supra note 28, at 33-34. That sexual devices can be used in sodomy is clear,
but they are neither particular nor essential to sodomy, and therefore that element is omitted
from this analysis.
176
Id. at 34 (“With regard to . . . Lawrence, then, the use of sex aids is different only in
the nature of the private sexual act.”) (emphasis added).
177
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
178
See Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir.
2004); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 2008). Casey is not
nearly as clear about what delineates an undue burden from an acceptable burden.
179
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
references to “fundamental proposition[s]” and “fundamental decisions,” but not
“fundamental right[s]”).
180
Id. at 578.
175

578

Richard Glover

[Vol. 100

traditionally a harbinger of rational basis review.181 The Texas statute
relied on moral disapproval of homosexuals rather than of sodomy,
specifically, and it sought to curtail only homosexual sodomy with a ban
directed strictly at gay people.182 Thus, the statute furthered no legitimate
state interest.183
If pure rational basis review is all that Lawrence demands, the
Williams court reached the correct conclusion. Rational basis is an
extremely deferential standard. Each of the several possible state goals
listed by the Williams courts are legitimate state interests.184 The only
question is whether the statute is a reasonable means of achieving those
goals. Though the Williams I court suggested it was not,185 every
subsequent Williams court found or assumed that the statute passes this low
bar.
Interestingly, because the Texas statute burdens use in a way that the
Alabama statute does not, the Reliable court could have also reached the
correct conclusion under rational basis review. First, the Reliable court
noted that, because of the breadth of the Texas statute’s prohibition, the
restriction amounts to a ban on use, which eliminates public morality as a
solitary legitimate state interest.186
The only remaining legitimate
interest—protecting citizens from exposure to offensive materials—fails the
reasonable relation test. The court stressed that those offended or harmed
by commerce in sexual devices would have to come to the nuisance.187
However, had the court relied only on rational basis review, its decision
would have gone too far. The court could have severed the restrictions on
giving and borrowing, thereby diminishing the statute’s burden and
reestablishing morality as a legitimate state interest.188 The Reliable court
181

See id. at 586, 599. But see Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of
Substantive Due Process, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 27-28 (2005) (cautioning against
attaching significance to “legitimate,” noting, Justice Douglas’s use of “legitimate” while
establishing a fundamental right in Griswold).
182
See Coles, supra note 181, at 28-29 (“Sodomy was perfectly acceptable when
practiced by ninety to ninety-six percent of Texans. . . . It was only wrong when performed
by same-sex couples.”).
183
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
184
See Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1285-87 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
185
See id. at 1288-93.
186
See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
187
See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 746 (5th Cir. 2008).
188
When the statute has no explicit severability provision, courts will often infer such
power. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328-29
(2006) (“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to
limit the solution to the problem. We prefer, for example, to enjoin only the unconstitutional
applications of a statute while leaving the other applications in force, or to sever its
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact[.]”) (citations omitted). Courts
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may not have considered this option because the basis of its decision, dicta
about rational bases notwithstanding, is the belief that Lawrence did not
rely on rational basis.
Just as the Lawrence Court failed to use the key strict scrutiny phrases,
it also failed to use key rational basis phrases, such as “minimum scrutiny,”
“arbitrary,” “irrational,” or “strong presumption of validity.”189 In fact, in
the same sentence of the opinion that “legitimate state interest” appears,
“justify” also appears.190 Traditional rational basis review is so deferential
that “justifications” for intrusions into individuals’ lives are not implicated;
it queries the legitimacy of the state’s purpose without regard to the
individual.191 Furthermore, the Lawrence Court adopts Justice Stevens’s
dissent in Bowers as “controlling” in this case.192 Each of the due process
cases that Stevens relies on in his Bowers dissent are strict scrutiny cases.193
The major missing indicator of strict scrutiny, aside from key phrases,
is a Glucksberg analysis of fundamental rights.194 But such an analysis is
not necessary if the right at issue is one established in a previous line of
cases.195 The Court explicitly situates Lawrence in the mold of Griswold
and Eisenstadt, cases protecting the sacred space of relationships.196 It is
argued that the Court decided in Lawrence that “gay people have the same

sometimes will not sever, even in the face of an explicit severability clause, if they find the
severance to be against the intention of the legislature. See, e.g., Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1013-16 (1983) (Rehnquist & White, JJ.,
dissenting). However, there is no indication here that the Fifth Circuit even entertained such
an inquiry, and the goal of the statute seems to be furthered by a continued ban on
commerce.
189
Coles, supra note 181, at 30.
190
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.”) (emphasis added).
191
Coles, supra note 181, at 30. But see Case, supra note 165, at 83-84 (noting that the
majority says “which can justify” rather than “that can justify,” the former being a nonrestrictive clause and so parenthetical, leading to the conclusion that despite the appearance
of “justify,” Lawrence still only applied rational basis review).
192
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
193
See Coles, supra note 181.
194
Id. at 32.
195
See id. at 34 (citing several instances where the court did not undertake a fundamental
right analysis when relying on a previously acknowledged fundamental right).
196
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-65; see David Cruz, The “Sexual Freedom Cases?”
Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299,
318 (2000) (suggesting these opinions most accurately portray a broader right to sex or
“‘freedom to engage in . . . sexual intercourse without fear of familial or reproductive
consequences’” (quoting Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin’s Freedom’s Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1313, 1325 (1997))).
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[fundamental] right to intimate relationships recognized in Griswold.”197
But what of couples, married and unmarried, or individuals interested in
sexual devices? According to this analysis, the Fifth Circuit was correct as
it explicitly noted that Lawrence applied and extended a pre-existing
right.198 The Eleventh Circuit’s error is not necessarily fatal, however,
since Alabama does not burden every means of attaining the devices.199 By
contrast, the Texas statute cuts off all avenues of procuring sexual devices
and so may “unduly burden” couples’ privacy rights.200
Lawrence’s implication on standards of review is astonishingly
unclear. However, at least for the Reliable court, the implication is
inconsequential. Under either rational basis or strict scrutiny, its conclusion
is justified. Level of scrutiny may also be inconsequential to the Williams
decision. What Casey protects from undue burden is an otherwise facially
acknowledged fundamental right. As the Williams court correctly notes, the
statute does not burden any cognizable fundamental right because, unlike
the Texas statute, it does not prohibit use. Before using Casey to demand
strict scrutiny from the Williams court, critics would first have to assert that
the fundamental right being protected is not the right to private use, but a
right to choose the means by which to achieve orgasm. That choice is what
Alabama’s commercial ban burdens.
2. The Collapsible Error & the Fundamental Right to Orgasm
What is necessary for a successful strict scrutiny substantive due
process claim is an assertion of sexual autonomy that focuses not on the act
or the partner, which are already protected by precedent,201 but on the end
(orgasm).202 This is best illustrated in terms of the collapsible error.
Courts commit the collapsible error when they subsume an equal
protection question (is a group, e.g., homosexuals, a suspect class?) into the
due process question (is there an underlying fundamental right, e.g., to
marriage?), defining the underlying interest by the targeted group (gay

197

See Coles, supra note 181, at 36.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
199
See discussion supra Part III.A.
200
See discussion supra Part III.B.
201
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (extending privacy right to private sex
between consenting adults); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring a right to choose
to terminate pregnancies); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right to
choose contraception to non-married couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (declaring a right of married couples to choose contraception).
202
See Lindemann, supra note 49, at 343 (quoting the Alabama Attorney General, who
declared no “constitutional right to purchase a product to use in pursuit of having an
orgasm”).
198
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marriage), and then limiting their analysis to substantive due process (is
there a fundamental right to gay marriage?).203 This error generally leads to
substantive due process questions so narrow that they are cognizable only
as rhetorical.204 The error also results, because of flawed analysis, in
judicial denial of both due process and equal protection.205
Despite its repeated, but arguably honest, attempts to frame the
question neither too narrowly nor too broadly, the Williams court
committed this error.206 The substantive due process question is nothing
less than the right to unburdened pursuit of orgasm,207 but the Williams
court conflated the class (device users) and the question (orgasm) into the
question of whether there is a fundamental right to use sexual devices in
pursuit of an orgasm. The Reliable court narrowly missed committing the
error by choosing not to define an interest at all, instead relying on the
Lawrence Court’s statement of liberty.208
There is a line of reasoning leading to a right to orgasm. Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Roe, by not discussing abstinence and other forms of sexual
gratification as possible alternatives, can be bases of inferring an underlying
right to adult consensual sexual activities.209
Lawrence implicitly
recognizes this by acknowledging sex sans procreation as a component of
self-identity.210 As gender, sex, and social paradigms break from the
previous male and female binary, “right to sex” and a focus on the pleasure
of the act, rather than a procreative purpose, may emerge.211
However, no opinion yet has enshrined sexual gratification. What the
Court has recognized is a right to simple, consensual sexual expression in
203
Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper Methodology
When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 685 (2008).
204
See, e.g., id. at 734-35 (“[The collapsible error] build[s] an inequality into the analysis
ab initio [and] creates an (unconstitutional) irrebuttable presumption that the underlying right
([e.g.,] homosexual sodomy) is not fundamental.”).
205
Id. at 733.
206
See Ellen Waldman & Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut: Erasing Women’s
Experiences from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 285, 306 (2005)
(claiming the Court “opportunistically replaces sexual privacy, an abstract concept[,] . . .
with particular sexual devices”).
207
Cf. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56
EMORY L.J. 1235, 1251 (2007) (“Due process sexual liberty requires plaintiffs to assert a
pleasure-based rather than a therapeutic rationale.”).
208
See discussion supra Part III.B.
209
See Cruz, supra note 196; Angela Holt, From My Cold Dead Hands: Williams v.
Pryor and the Constitutionality of Alabama’s Anti-Vibrator Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 927, 94041 (2002) (explaining the “abstinence gap” argument).
210
Herald, supra note 28, at 29 (“The Lawrence decision disengaged sex from
reproduction by protecting sexual relationships where procreation was not possible.”).
211
Id.
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private, married or not, procreative or not, in both hetero- and homosexual
relationships. Success under current Court doctrine would turn the critique
on its head. After working to separate the androcentric conflation of sex
and orgasm,212 this criticism would have us demand their fungibility.
Furthermore, in the cases where the Court provides due process protection
to sexual liberty, the Court has been explicit that the interest it is protecting
transcends sex.213 Judges define rights in sexual terms only when preparing
to deny their existence;214 when protecting sexual liberty, judges deliver
opinions in “grand and euphemistic nonsexual terms.”215 Thus, in Bowers,
the Court denies a right to “homosexual sodomy,”216 while in Lawrence it
speaks of defending a bond that is “more enduring.”217 The Lawrence
Court struck down state interference in the formation by homosexuals of
“serious domestic relationships,” but stopped well short of giving sex,
pleasurable or otherwise, any social or legal status.218
Finally, even if orgasm and its pursuit are eventually protected by
Court doctrine, that does not immediately lead to the conclusion that
mechanically assisted orgasm is protected. Protected pursuit of orgasm
coupled with a better understanding of female sexual response219 may call
for more responsible lovers,220 but it does not directly demand access to
212

See ANNIE POTTS, THE SCIENCE/FICTION OF SEX: FEMINIST DECONSTRUCTION AND THE
VOCABULARIES OF HETEROSEX 99-100 (2002) (“[P]erhaps this embryonic idea of . . . sex
would incorporate the ‘possibilities’ of multiple pleasures; climax would become neither the
target nor the non-target of sex, neither the ‘terminus ad quem’ nor the origin toward which
we struggle back, but rather it would be a supplement . . . nor would [orgasms] be mystified
to (always) mean the only source of some peak experience and intimacy.”). This Comment
does not intend to over-generalize by referring to a single feminist position. However, a poll
of the applicability of various feminist theories would fill a paper in its own right.
213
See Buchanan, supra note 207, at 1272-73.
214
See id. at 1273-74 (citing as examples Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) and
Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)).
215
Id. at 1273-74 (citing as examples Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957)).
216
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
217
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; see also Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty
of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1408 (2004) (noting that no information in
the record indicates that Lawrence and his sexual partner, Garner, were in a relationship, and
asking rhetorically, “More enduring than what? Than sex?”).
218
See Franke, supra note 217, at 1417.
219
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
220
In the same sense that access to contraception is protected, but not provided in all
forms by all methods, recognizing a right to pursuing orgasm does not demand that the state
sanction all means of achieving orgasm. Cf. David Dolinko, Retributivism,
Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 LAW & PHIL. 507, 519 n.36
(1997) (“One might well believe that the intensely pleasurable sensations accompanying
orgasm are intrinsically good, without for a moment supposing that this suggests a duty to
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electromechanical vibrators. This is certainly not an attractive state of the
law. It protects primarily male interests even when addressing “women’s
issues.”221 Nevertheless, it is an unavoidable consequence of modern
substantive due process.
However, Lawrence did not label consensual adult sexual activity as a
fundamental right calling for strict scrutiny, nor did it simply apply rational
basis. Instead, “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in
the most private of places, the home,” was described as “a personal
relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals.”222 It is quite possible that another line of analysis
was at work.
3. Blurring Standards of Scrutiny & Coercive Morality
A final approach to Lawrence views it as one of several recent cases
indicating that “the certainty of the dichotomy between strict scrutiny and
[rational basis] scrutiny is breaking down.”223
Justice Stevens’s
concurrence in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center expressed his
doubts that the strict/rational distinction is tenable.224 Justice Marshall,
dissenting in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
expressed “disagreement with the Court’s rigidified approach to equal
protection analysis.”225 Indeed, the creation of a third category, so-called
“intermediate scrutiny,” was itself a clear signal that the Court was
becoming dissatisfied with its categories.226 Thus, Lawrence may be the

set up state institutions to dole out orgasms . . . . There is likewise no duty on any individual
to provide others with orgasms whenever he or she is in a position to do so.”).
221
See discussion infra Part IV.B; cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1300 (1991) (“Women can have abortions so that
men can have sex.”).
222
Donald L. Beschle, Lawrence Beyond Gay Rights: Taking the Rationality
Requirement for Justifying Criminal Statutes Seriously, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 237 (2005)
(quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567).
223
Id. at 233; see also Barnett, supra note 156; Karlan, supra note 166, at 1450
(suggesting Lawrence “undermines the traditional tiers of scrutiny altogether”); Calvin
Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 946
(2004) (“[I]t is not too soon to declare that the combined effect of the methods employed by
the Court in Lawrence and Grutter has done serious damage to the health of tiered scrutiny
[which may be] beginning to collapse.”); Sunstein, supra note 164, at 48 (“An alternative
reading is that the Court deliberately refused to specify its ‘tier’ of analysis because it was
rejecting the idea of tiers altogether.”).
224
473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I have never been persuaded that
these so-called ‘standards’ adequately explain the decisional process.”).
225
411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
226
See Beschle, supra note 222, at 223-33.
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culmination of a “crisis in analogical reasoning.”227 If Lawrence signaled
an explicit turn toward balancing rather than tiering, what direction do we
have for weighing the balance when the government’s interest is morality?
The Court in Lawrence indicates the scope of the moral dimension,
repeatedly limiting protection to “conduct not harmful to others” and
“absent injury to a person.”228 This would seem to imply that “state
interests are synonymous with duties to others.”229 Two categories of
prohibitions then become unjustifiable: those that attempt to preserve
traditional moral or cultural practices from erosion or change and those that
prohibit acts as inherently wrong regardless of effect on others.230 This
does not mean that majorities must remain silent on strictly moral issues;
rather, they are confined to resistance by “argument, incentives, and
nongovernmental social pressure.”231 Coercion by criminal sanction
confines both contemporary and future liberty by “freez[ing] traditional
moral concepts.”232 In fact, coercion to virtue, a contradiction in terms,233
directly conflicts with democratic principles by removing from minorities,
by pain of punishment, the freedom to attempt to become a majority.234
The issue of coercive criminal sanction does not immediately remove
morality as any rational basis for legal prohibition.235 Rather, it insists that
the government cannot rely solely on morality and therefore must explain,

227
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 (1992).
228
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 572 (2003); cf. Allen, supra note 163, at 104748 (noting that, of the many moralities in the world, the Lawrence Court was concerned with
religious, traditional, and ethical dictates on behavior).
229
Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1,
19 (2007).
230
See Beschle, supra note 222, at 264; see also Robert J. Delahunty & Antonio F.
Perez, Moral Communities or a Market State: The Supreme Court’s Vision of the Police
Power in the Age of Globalization, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 637, 694 (2005) (“Lawrence
diminishes the States’ ability to use criminal law to serve expressive and educative purposes,
tending therefore to restrict criminal law to purely instrumental uses.”).
231
Beschle, supra note 222, at 266.
232
Id. at 265.
233
Id. at 268 (noting that obedience to authority is the only “virtue” that coercion
instills).
234
See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING 52-53 (1988).
235
See Allen, supra note 163, at 1053-54 (calling it “intuitive” that the Lawrence Court
was not declaring that any reliance on morality automatically made a statute
“constitutionally infirm”); see also Delahunty & Perez, supra note 230, at 639-40
(explaining the “Central Tradition” of political philosophy, preserved in American
federalism, that the State’s primary and defining attribute is as a moral community).
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by more than simple majority preference, its employment of coercion.236
This would shift the burden of proof to the state in cases involving sexual
privacy.237 Of course, this is still a relatively low hurdle. Legislatures can
simply mask their moral motivations,238 leaving “plenty of room to cook the
books.”239 Nevertheless, by forcing legislators to wrangle with empirical
data, it may make them at least marginally less biased while also creating a
clear record for their constituents and the courts.240 At the least, requiring a
modicum of justification that goes beyond simple majority in these cases
certainly is unlikely to make the process worse.241
Which way do the statutes in Williams and Reliable tip the balance?
Surprisingly, again, both courts may have been correct, if for the wrong
reasons. Williams VI mistakenly relies on morality alone as a rational basis
for Alabama’s prohibition.242 However, that finding was preliminary and,
in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, preemptive of other state justifications
made clear in Williams I (banning public displays of obscene materials,
banning the commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism for its own
sake, and banning commerce in obscene material).243 Each of these
justifications has the potential, however small, to withstand Lawrence
coercive morality review. In fact, the only thing Lawrence coercive
morality immediately protects is the one thing Alabama explicitly does not
prohibit: use.
The Reliable court reached its conclusion by correctly applying the
reasoning of Lawrence’s coercive morality review, although it is not clear
that it relied on that analysis. As the Reliable majority explicitly states,
Lawrence did not put an end to morality-based legislation.244 Because the
Texas statute contains additional prohibitions on borrowing and giving, it

236

See Beschle, supra note 222, at 279 (indicating that Lawrence, by such an
interpretation, “makes the rational basis requirement of the Due Process Clause more than a
paper tiger”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582, 584-85 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (repeatedly emphasizing that a state’s interests must extend beyond simple
morality).
237
See Herald, supra note 28, at 35-37.
238
Susan B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1240 (2004).
239
Koppelman, supra note 166, at 1179.
240
See Allen, supra note 163, at 1066; Goldberg, supra note 238 (noting that unfettered
morality justifications give legislators “virtual carte blanche”); Herald, supra note 28, at 3637.
241
Allen, supra note 163, at 1066.
242
See discussion supra Part III.A.
243
See id.
244
See text accompanying supra note 104.
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prohibited acts unrelated to the supposed harm to others.245 However, the
Reliable court could have severed those offending provisions without doing
harm to the statute.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION, PATHOLOGIZING SEXUALITY, AND THE
HIDDEN DANGERS OF SEXUAL AUTONOMY

Much literature has arisen around the possibility that the Lawrence
majority, like the O’Connor concurrence, may have made their decision on
equal protection grounds but been reluctant to couch it explicitly in those
terms.246 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”247 Like substantive due process review, any
discriminatory state law will be scrutinized at a level dependant on the
nature of the classification in the statute.248 Classifications that are based on
race, national origin, religion, or alienage warrant strict scrutiny review.249
Gender and illegitimacy classifications warrant an “intermediate scrutiny”
review, requiring the state to provide “exceedingly persuasive
justification”250—important government interest furthered by substantially
related means251—for its policy. All other classifications, including
homosexuality, warrant rational basis review.252 If a statute is not facially
discriminatory, the Court requires a showing of discriminatory intent in
equal protection claims; disparate impact is merely “evidentiary” and,

245
Note that, despite having the more restrictive ban, Texas, unlike Alabama never
advanced an interest in preventing stimulation and auto-eroticism for its own sake.
246
See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 166 (suggesting the Court was not clear on level of
scrutiny because its decision rested on a conclusion about equality—that class-based
animosity by definition lacks a legitimate government purpose—to undergird its analysis of
due process, ultimately making a decision that, “sounds in equal protection” regardless of the
Court’s “doctrinal handle”).
247
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
248
Also like substantive due process, equal protection analysis has seen blurring of the
review boundaries. See Beschle, supra note 222 (arguing that the Court’s doctrine has
evolved to eliminate the fundamental distinctions between strict, intermediate, and rational
basis scrutiny, adopting a balancing test that compares the interests if the class and the state).
249
See Beschle, supra note 222 (describing categories warranting different levels of
scrutiny). For explanation of strict scrutiny, see discussion supra Part IV.A.
250
See Personnell Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
251
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
252
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). Some states have found
heightened scrutiny appropriate for purposes of equal protection under their state
constitutions. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). For an explanation
of rational basis review, see discussion supra Part IV.A.
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absent a “stark pattern,” “not determinative.”253 Indeed, the standard is so
high that the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a facially
neutral veteran’s preference scheme—one that excluded 98% of women.254
The equal protection criticism of anti-sexual-device statutes255 begins
with the recognition that intermediate scrutiny frequently fails to take into
account important and fundamental differences between the sexes256 and, in
its attempts to recognize or equalize those differences, the state often
compensates in ways that compound the problem.257 Second, because
gender discrimination by predominantly male legislatures is often a
byproduct of conscious ignorance, benign obliviousness, or lack of selfawareness, intentional discrimination is an impossible standard.258 The case
of sexual devices, as the historical development of vibrators indicates, is

253

See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977);
see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (adopting a twofold inquiry into (1) whether a statutory
classification is facially discriminatory and, if not, (2) whether any “adverse effect reflects
invidious . . . discrimination”; but limiting the second inquiry as “an important starting
point” and still requiring a showing of “purposeful discrimination”). But see Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (critiquing the discriminatory intent standard as an
impossibility on the Freudian and cognitive psychological grounds that such intent is often
simultaneously both manifest and subconscious).
254
See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256.
255
See generally Herald, supra note 28. Though distinct from equal protection with
regard to homosexuals, a similar argument can be made based on research noted infra notes
264–267.
256
See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1673
(1997) (arguing the state’s focus on gender neutrality leads to inaction where intervention
would best ensure equality).
257
See LEONORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985) (noting that
removing maternal preferences in divorce proceedings hurt women and children); Buchanan,
supra note 207 (arguing that the government’s reliance on the differences between men and
pregnant women, inter alia, effectively “enforces traditional gender roles by binding women
to reproductive consequences of heterosexual activity while excusing men”).
258
See Herald, supra note 28, at 22; Lawrence, supra note 253; Michael Selmi, Proving
Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 296324 (1997) (finding current precedent to require proving that the “only plausible conclusion”
is discriminatory intent); Gila Stopler, “A Rank Usurpation of Power”—The Role of
Patriarchal Religion and Culture in the Subordination of Women, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 365, 366 (2008) (“Liberalism disregards the institutions, practices, discourses, and
norms of a religion or culture as a socially and politically significant site of power, which
severely curtails its ability to ensure that the exercise of power and authority over the
individual is justified and that the rights of the individual are safeguarded.”); Waldman &
Herald, supra note 206, at 287 (stating that “stereotypical thinking and cognitive biases lead
to a skewed ‘database’ that undergirds legal doctrines that disadvantage women,” and that
“recent advances in cognitive psychology suggest that most discriminatory behavior results
from . . . processes that occur far beyond the reach of the conscious self”).
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just such a situation where legitimate differences between men and women
are smoothed over by facially neutral laws that are impossible to challenge,
despite their disparate impact, because of the lack of clear ill motive.259
With a proper understanding of the androcentrism within which the statutes
are situated, the state of Alabama’s position can be seen as arguing that
sexual devices that are either free, borrowed, imported, or mislabeled are
not a threat to morality or traditional sexual roles.260 In this way, the state
accurately describes, with clarity and no sense of irony, the irrationality of
the statute’s operation.261 Thus, according to the equal protection critique, a
new method of addressing legitimate equal protection concerns is called
for.262
Scientific research into female sexuality and sexual response is scant,
with most investigations consisting of extended studies of men and the later
assumption that the same is true of women.263 This is true despite studies
that indicate that most women do not climax from penetration,264 nearly half
of women use sexual devices,265 sexual devices are used primarily by

259
Cf. Buchanan, supra note 207, at 1241 (“The legal coercion of sexual morality is
typically interpreted in a way that requires the control, surveillance, and punishment of
women, but rarely of men.”).
260
See Waldman & Herald, supra note 206, at 305.
261
Id.
262
Cf. NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 26 (1989) (interpreting Foucault to say that “if power is
instantiated in mundane social practices and relations, then efforts to dismantle or transform
the regime must address those practices and relations”).
263
See Medical Research Lacks Female Participants, MED. ETHICS ADVISOR, Aug. 1,
2004, at 91-92 (quoting a Society for Women’s Health Research leader saying “[f]or a long
time in medicine, we had this thing called the ‘male norm[:]’ [i]t was just assumed that the
male was ‘normal’ and women were just small men with different plumbing and a hormone
problem”); Cynthia Gorney, Designing Women: Scientists and Capitalists Dream of Finding
a Drug that Could Boost Female Sexuality, There’s One Little Problem . . . , WASH. POST,
Jun. 30, 2002, at W8 (quoting a research psychologist saying psychology articles “go on and
on about male sexuality, and there are all the diagnostic measures, and so on. And then they
say something in two sentences, akin to: ‘and we assume the same thing is true for
women’”); cf. Waldman & Herald, supra note 206, at 295 (“The female is defined in relation
to the male, her sexuality governed by male needs.”).
264
BARRY R. KOMISARUK ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF ORGASM 71 (2006); DESMOND MORRIS,
THE NAKED WOMAN: A STUDY OF THE FEMALE BODY 213 (2005) (putting the number as high
as two out of every three women).
265
See, e.g., BERMAN CTR., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF SEXUAL AIDS & DEVICES: A
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO SATISFACTION AND QUALITY OF LIFE
(2004), available at http://www.sexlibido.cz/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=V2SwJSfzUsM%3D
(finding the 44% of 2,594 women between eighteen and sixty years of age have used a
sexual device; 20% self-stimulate at least once a week; of those, 60% use a device to do so);
see also DUREX, GIVE AND RECEIVE: 2005 GLOBAL SEX SURVEY RESULTS (2005), available at
http://www.data360.org/pdf/20070416064139.Global%20Sex%20Survey.pdf (finding that
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women,266 and by lesbian women in particular.267 Indeed, almost all of the
appellants in Williams are women, with the only men involved being either
husbands of or business co-owners with female petitioners.268 However,
because there is no indication of purposeful discrimination, women have
been forced to challenge the statutes on medical and therapeutic claims of
substantive due process.269
These litigation strategies only serve to reinforce existing biases
toward women and female sexuality by insinuating that female sexual
gratification is not an acceptable objective in its own right.270 Furthermore,
they support a standard that, because of its focus on the application of each
individual device, makes general support of sexual devices impossible.271
Courts recognize the validity of the devices only if the device is for medical
or therapeutic purposes.272 This, in turn, forces women who use these

43% of respondents in the United States have used a vibrator, compared to 19% of
respondents that have used no sex enhancers). The author is aware of selection biases in the
Durex survey; the shortcomings of the survey highlight the state of research in the field.
266
See Durex, supra note 265 (finding that vibrators “are more popular among women
than men—26% compared to 19%,” a comparative disparity of almost 40%).
267
Clive M. Davis et al., Characteristics of Vibrator Use Among Women, 33 J. SEX RES.
313, 316 (1996) (finding that, by age twenty, 36% of lesbian respondents had used a
vibrator, compared to 11% of heterosexual women; by age thirty, 86% of lesbian
respondents had used a vibrator).
268
See Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1261-64 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
The appellant in Reliable was a corporation.
269
See discussion supra Part IV.A; Lindemann, supra note 49, at 338 (“The challengers
argue predominantly not for the rights of sexually-healthy women but for those with
dysfunctions that require physical therapy.”); Waldman & Herald, supra note 206, at 310
(“In the medical profession, . . . female sexuality [is defined] as successful when it responds
well to the needs of men, and as dysfunctional when it does not. In the legal arena, sadly,
the most successful cases . . . are those where the courts can be convinced to consider the
needs of these dysfunctional women . . . .”).
270
See Yakaré-Oulé Jansen, The Right to Freely Have Sex? Beyond Biology:
Reproductive Rights and Sexual Self-Determination, 40 AKRON L. REV. 311, 319 (2007)
(arguing that “a focus on women reduced to ‘suffering bodies in need of protection by the
law and by the State’ can frustrate more fundamental goals, such as women’s need for
participation and equality” (quoting Alice M. Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women,
and Human Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies Get Protection, 7 HEALTH & HUM.
RTS.: INT’L J. 16, 25 (2004))); Lindemann, supra note 49, at 344 (noting that this is
“precisely the same message that the statutes themselves sent in their discouragement of
autonomous female sexuality”).
271
Cf. Lindemann, supra note 49, at 337 (quoting Dr. Sandor Gardos’s paraphrasing of
his testimony in Sewell v. State, 233 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1977), as: “DA: Now Professor Doctor
Gardos, you stated that these devices have therapeutic value. Is that Correct? Gardos: Yes.
DA: And have you ever prescribed a device similar to this one? Gardos: Uh, no, I must
admit that I have never prescribed that a patient attach a dildo to his or her chin”).
272
Herald, supra note 28, at 24.
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devices into the Morton’s Fork of admitting that they are either sick or
criminal in the eyes of the law.273
However, the few studies of female sexuality that exist show that
sexual dysfunction is more prevalent in women than men,274 with at least
43% and as many as 90% of women experiencing sexual problems.275 This
seems to indicate that the “dysfunction” is actually natural, a byproduct of
lack of understanding of female sexuality.276 Some critics seize on this
while pointing out the legality of products, like Viagra, that treat male
sexual dysfunction, to suggest discriminatory intent.277 Certainly, there
have been upsetting juxtapositions of male and female therapeutic drugs
before,278 but the critics’ argument is self-defeating in this context. Viagra
and other virility drugs—which are blood flow enhancers, not mechanical
devices—are regulated. Furthermore, the obscenity statutes ban the sale
and distribution of other male sexual aids, such as “cock-rings.” Finally,
attacks on the technical details of the statute as over- or under-inclusive or
lacking specificity279 do nothing to directly promote the fundamental

273

See id.
See Edward O. Laumann et al., Sexual Dysfunction in the United States: Prevalence
and Predictors, 281 JAMA 537, 541 (1999).
275
See MAINES, supra note 12, at 61 (noting early studies showing rates of 60-90%);
Kevin L. Billups, The Role of Mechanical Devices in Treating Female Sexual Dysfunction
and Enhancing the Female Sexual Response, 20 WORLD J. UROLOGY 137, 137-41 (2002)
(showing a rate of 43%). But see MAINES, supra note 12, at 63-66 (noting the clear potential
to interpret the existing data in the opposite direction).
276
See SHERE HITE, THE HITE REPORT: A NATIONWIDE STUDY OF FEMALE SEXUALITY 236
(1976) (“Even the question being asked is wrong . . . [t]he question should not be: Why
aren’t women having orgasms from intercourse? But, rather: Why have we insisted women
should orgasm from intercourse?”); Herald, supra note 28, at 25. Contra BERGLER &
KROGER, KINSEY’S MYTH OF FEMALE SEXUALITY 48 (1954) (claiming, almost laughably, that
there is no scientific or statistical objection to declaring 80-90% of the female population
abnormal). Despite this, few sex specific studies have occurred. See Waldman & Herald,
supra note 206, at 299 (“[T]he reasons behind women’s lack of sexual responsiveness have
not generated much scientific inquiry . . . . Rather [these statistics on “normalcy”] have been
met with bland acceptance.”).
277
See, e.g., Shelly Elimelekh, Note, The Constitutional Validity of Circuit Court
Opinions Limiting the American Right to Sexual Privacy, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
261, 287 (2006) (suggesting that “it is difficult to demarcate the difference between sex toys
and sex drugs, yet the government has clearly drawn this distinction”); cf. Sarah E. Bycott,
Controversy Aroused: North Carolina Mandates Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives in
the Wake of Viagra, 79 N.C. L. REV. 779. 797 (2001) (discussing the distinction between
Viagra as “medically necessary,” versus contraceptives as “life-enhancing”).
278
See, e.g., Virginia Postrel, Sex Mandates, FORBES, May 31, 1999, at 121 (quoting a
Reverend’s characterization of mandatory contraceptive coverage as “disgusting and
demoralizing,” whereas Viagra “enhances a natural function”).
279
See, e.g., Elimelekh, supra note 277, at 287-88.
274
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underlying principle of sexual autonomy and recognition of natural female
sexual response.
A similar attack juxtaposes the Court’s open acceptance and protection
of “normal, healthy” non-procreative sexual pleasure—mainstream
pornography, effectively defined by what heterosexual men like or are
supposed to like—with the Court’s reluctance to recognize the same nonprocreative interests of women and sexual minorities.280 To the extent that
such a criticism highlights the fact that sexual device prohibitions
disproportionately affect women and sexual minorities—groups less likely
to be interested in traditional heterosexual pornographic media and more
likely to be interested in traditionally non-expressive sexual aids281—it is
certainly valid. However, the claim that bans on sexual devices “would
never [have been] permitted by the standards developed to protect straight
men’s porn”282 is not supported by either the language of the statutes
themselves or the Court’s jurisprudential history.
Two important
distinctions are glossed over in this criticism.
First, the exception the Court carved out for prurient pornography was
one for possession and use, not for production or commerce.283 Courts at all
levels—state and federal, trial and appellate—have explicitly recognized
that same exception for sexual devices.284 Second, although neither the
Fifth nor Eleventh Circuits reached the First Amendment question, the
Kansas and Mississippi Supreme Courts provide relevant analysis. Miller
and other First Amendment pornography cases are not applicable because
devices are not speech or expression.285 At best, devices are symbolic
speech, subject to the content-neutral test set forth in United States v.
O’Brien.286 It is an unfortunate reality that pornography is more likely to
capture heterosexual male interests than those of women and sexual
minorities,287 and devices are more valuable to women and sexual
280

See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 207, at 1248-49.
See supra notes 258-261 and accompanying text.
282
Buchanan, supra note 207, at 1250.
283
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
284
See discussion supra Part III.
285
See State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Kan. 1990) (listing Miller-protected
objects as “book[s], movie[s], or play[s], rather than a device”). But see Bret Boyce,
Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 299, 339-45 (2008) (criticizing the
Court’s speech/conduct distinction).
286
See PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So. 2d 1244, 1249-50 (Miss. 2004) (citing United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
287
The claim in this Comment is not that there are no “pornographic” outlets for women
and sexual minorities. When it comes to pornography, the tail is long indeed. See Tom
Chivers, “Rule 34,” Internet Rules and Laws: The Top 10 from Godwin to Poe, THE
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6408927/Internet281

592

Richard Glover

[Vol. 100

minorities than to heterosexual men; but it is far from per se evidence of an
“insidious [legal] double standard.”288 Rather, the observation suggests
that, with proper scientific support, our understanding of “normal, healthy”
sexual behavior in women may require a change in, not an extension of, our
current protections of sexual expression.289 Such a change would be an
inappropriate undertaking for a district or circuit court.290
A final criticism suggests that these statutes stigmatize in the same
way that the one at issue in Lawrence did.291 This is patently false.
Lawrence was concerned in relevant part with the fact that, due to the
statute, merely being homosexual was taken by employers and the public as
a tacit admission of criminality.292 Here, there can be no such inference as
one can be homosexual, heterosexual, married, in a relationship, or single
and still have use for such devices. Though these statutes stigmatize by
criminalizing the sale of devices utilized in arguably “normal” sexual
conduct, there is no de facto public characterization of all potential device
users (literally every member of the community) as criminal or sick. The
characterization is a personal one incumbent on the individual device user
to make. This may be no less damaging to the psyche, but it is
fundamentally different from the stigma Lawrence was concerned with.
As detrimental and disturbing as the pathologizing of female sexuality
may be, the scarcity and narrowness of scientific studies, both of “normal”
sexual response and the role of sexual devices,293 counsels against taking
major steps on these grounds. Court imposition prior to commission and
completion of better and more thorough research runs the risk of making
the issue dead letter prior to any enlightenment.294 Furthermore, if such
rules-and-laws-the-top-10-from-Godwin-to-Poe.html; Wikipedia, 34 (Number): In Other
Fields—Rule 34, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/34_(number)#In_other_fields (last visited Feb.
6, 2010). Instead, this Comment claims that, by volume, the overwhelming majority of
pornography is tailored to heterosexual male interests.
288
Tristan Taormino, Dallas Dildo Defiance, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 17, 2002, available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0221/taormino.php.
289
See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing potential First Amendment protections of
sexual expression).
290
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that
addressing the First Amendment implications of Lawrence for this issue would be
premature).
291
See, e.g., Herald, supra note 28, at 34 (“[T]hat same stigma is present here.”).
292
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581-82 (2003).
293
See Waldman & Herald, supra note 206, at 303 (characterizing the state of relevant
scientific study as “inaccurate or incomplete”).
294
See Franke, supra note 217, at 1415-18 (warning of the compartmentalizing nature of
judicial solutions and comparing the restrictive effect of Lawrence on the efforts of
homosexual rights activists to the effect of Brown on the “black civil rights movement”);
Susana T. Fried & Ilana Landsberg-Lewis, Sexual Rights: From Concept to Strategy, in 3
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studies do occur despite a Court decision invalidating obscenity statutes,
any discrepancy between the studies’ findings and the Court’s reasoning
would endanger the entire ruling. Finally, as the legislative and judicial
struggles over the proper role of homosexuality in modern society show,
backlash to changes previously thought to be relatively innocuous can be
both discouraging and dangerous.295 These are the growing pangs of any
expansion of cultural consciousness, but it would be best to enter the fray
with as much validating research as possible. Furthermore, exactly as the
Williams IV court indicates, the scarcity of device bans and the reluctance
of states to amend those bans where they are declared unconstitutional on
technicalities indicate that the democratic process has been successful and
may be superior for these ends.296 Though this is hardly reassuring to
people who benefit greatly from the use of sexual devices, achieving
“victory” too early only leaves open doors that may invite failure in the
future.297
Regardless, neither of the appellate courts that have considered the
issue have made their decisions on these grounds, nor can they. What the
critique demands is an expansion of equal protection with respect to gender
generally and sexuality specifically. Within the courts, only the Supreme
Court can achieve that end. To the extent that the critique is correct, the
circuit split is ideal for the Court to clarify, expand, and empower both
Lawrence and equal protection jurisprudence. However, that will be

WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 114, 114 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean
Koenig eds., 2001) (calling to “sustain the fluidity of the concept and its ability to include an
ever-growing understanding of the range of experiences . . . to expand the boundaries of
what sexual rights mean, rather than limiting its application and meaning with overdefinition”); Jansen, supra note 270, at 334 (noting the “risk of excluding” that would fatally
limit a declaration of sexual rights).
295
See Case, supra note 165, at 79-81 (recalling, in this “Kulturkampf,” that Clinton’s
modest achievements for homosexuals in the military were followed by more involuntary
discharges than ever; Boulder’s antidiscrimination ordinance led to Amendment 2; the
Hawaii Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage decision led to the Defense of Marriage Act and
a Hawaiian constitutional amendment; and that “Lawrence itself seems to have sparked
intensified interest in a federal constitutional amendment on same-sex marriage and a sharp
decline in support in the polls for gay rights;” not to mention the experience in Britain,
which the Lawrence majority cited as a shining example, of “more virulent prosecution of
public homosexual acts” coupled with “a very narrow definition of what was ‘private’ and
hence not criminal”).
296
See Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1244 n.14 (11th Cir.
2004). Critics may argue that statutes like the one at issue in Lawrence were rare as well.
However, that fails to account for the foregoing arguments distinguishing the
unconstitutionality of anti-sodomy laws and the constitutionality of these statutes.
297
Cf. MAINES, supra note 12, at 66 (indicating, ironically, that legalizing vibrators
actually enforces the androcentric view because it relieves men of responsibility for
stimulating the clitoris).
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impossible on this round of litigation, as the Texas attorney general has
decided not to petition for a writ of certiorari in Reliable.298
C. FIRST AMENDMENT: PORNOGRAPHY, PROCREATION, AND SEXUAL
EXPRESSION299

Though there is a dearth of judicial and academic support for First
Amendment protection of sexual expression,300 it is possible that Lawrence
was a watershed decision clarifying just such a safeguard.301 The Court’s
due process protection of private, sexual relationships began with a marital
procreative liberty found scattered throughout the Constitution.302 Though
the Court eventually extended the safeguard to non-marital relationships,
the Court did not protect sexual relationships generally.303 Similarly, the
Court began its protection of private sexual speech and expression with “the
weight of the United States’ ‘whole constitutional heritage.’”304
Specifically, the Court protected a man’s private collection of pornography
as an extension of his liberty to pursue happiness in order to safeguard his
intellect and emotions.305 However, the Court did not protect pornography
generally as an expressive outlet, thereby allowing governments to regulate

298

See Kandyba, supra note 129.
This Section focuses on Lawrence’s potentially instructive impact on the First
Amendment’s protection of speech and expression. Scholars have argued that statutes such
as the one in question may also violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Cf. Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2005). Such
an argument is beyond the scope of this Comment.
300
See James Allon Garland, Breaking the Enigma Code: Why the Law Has Failed to
Recognize Sex as Expressive Conduct Under the First Amendment, and Why Sex Between
Men Proves that It Should, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 159, 164 n.27, 195-203 (2003)
(summarizing the scholarship and the law prior to Lawrence).
301
See Allen, supra note 163, at 1062 (“Lawrence has significantly undermined the very
foundation upon which the Court has built the obscenity doctrine . . . [and so] requires a
reevaluation of the doctrine.”); James Allon Garland, Sex as a Form of Gender and
Expression After Lawrence v. Texas, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 297, 299 (2006) (describing
the Lawrence decision as “not only a potential doctrinal watershed, [but also] utterly
touching”). Contra Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography, Morality, and Harm: Why
Miller Should Survive Lawrence, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 611 (2008).
302
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-84 (1965) (referencing the
“emanations” from “penumbras” of several Amendments in the Bill of Rights).
303
See Garland, supra note 297, at 297 (calling Lawrence the Court’s first opinion not
only to recognize same-sex intimacy but also to approve of sex without any reference to
procreation).
304
See id. at 301 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)).
305
See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65; Garland, supra note 301, at 302 (“The Court
concluded that governmental intrusion ‘into the contents of his library’ (of porn) endangered
not only his thoughts but his ‘emotions and sensations’ and, thus, his right to ‘satisfy his
intellectual and emotional needs’ (for porn).”) (citations omitted).
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it in a manner inconsistent with free expression.306 Thus, with regard to sex
prior to Lawrence, the Court had created a “pornographic-procreative
dyad”: two outlets of desire, linked by sex, that had achieved limited
protection without implicating the value or meaning of the expressive act
that undergirds them.307 Against this backdrop, Lawrence recognized the
protection previously framed in terms of procreation instead as one of
intimacy that ultimately finds its expression in sex.308 It may have reframed
the pornographic portion of the dyad as well.309
Rather than extending its previous discussions of sex as
“mysterious,”310 “sensitive,” and “key” to human existence,311 the Lawrence
majority focuses on the relationship, framing sex as one “expressi[ve]”
component.312 The Court never references the First Amendment directly or
any of its jurisprudence on that topic.313 However, it does discuss, in
language quite similar to its opinion in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,314
“intimate and personal choices” that “define one’s own concept of
existence.”315 Sex that is “intimate,” “personal,” and private may not
intuitively seem communicative, but speech can be expressive without an
audience.316 Furthermore, if sex is regarded as an expressive speech act, the
fact that the action in question is illegal is not dispositive of its
protection.317
Some critics argue that only traditional coital sex expresses appropriate
values.318 However, this is precisely the kind of monopolization of ideas
against which First Amendment protections of speech and expression

306
See Garland, supra note 301, at 302 (noting that in other contexts, for example flag
burning, claims that expressive conduct is “offensive” have been declared unconstitutional
attempts to monopolize ideas).
307
Id. at 303.
308
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588, 574, 577-78 (2003).
309
See generally Garland, supra note 301.
310
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
311
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973).
312
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
313
See Garland, supra note 301, at 304.
314
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
315
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
316
Garland, supra note 301, at 298 (citing, inter alia, Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, 656).
317
Id. at 305; City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283, 289 (2000) (plurality)
(holding that despite bans on nudity as a summary offense, nude dancing is still entitled to
First Amendment protection); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563-66 (1991)
(finding that a misdemeanor offense is still entitled to First Amendment protection).
318
See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1049 (1994).
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defend.319 That similar sex acts can express a wide variety of messages320
does not eliminate their protection. The parties involved in the expression
define the expression,321 and speech acts are protected no matter how
“bizarre,”322 “abstract[,] or perplexing.”323 This does not mean that there
can be no interference with sex as an expressive act; a compelling
government interest can overcome the citizen’s speech right.324 However,
the government cannot object to the outward expressions of some
relationships simply because an unpopular sex act is assumed to be part of
it.325
Nevertheless, the indecisive language in Lawrence provides at best a
tenuous link to a supposed watershed in First Amendment civil liberties. It
is certainly not the kind of language that a circuit court can justify seizing
when considering cases with long lines of precedent.326
Further
clarification from the Court is absolutely essential to a defensible claim for
sexual devices as a necessary component of protected sexual expression.
V. CONCLUSION
The world has been so male-centered for so long, it is no wonder that judges find it
difficult to do the archaeological work necessary to unearth the biases. Even more
destructive, however, is that courts show a willingness to cover biased rules in neutral
rhetoric, thus bubble wrapping the problem with even more layers of protection. By
returning to an analysis of substantive due process that protects only those rights
historically protected, the court’s ‘neutral’ analysis disfavors women who have for
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Garland, supra note 301, at 298.
Id. at 316-17 (“[S]cientific evidence shows that overwhelming majorities of
Americans engage in sex to express love and to feel loved in return. By no means does this
indicate that sex for pleasure . . . lacks expression. Sexual contact can show an
understanding of a partner’s needs or appreciation of a part of the body. Group sex can
celebrate the rejection of social mores, and even autonomous sex can have educational and
other creativity values.” (citations omitted)).
321
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
322
Id. at 410.
323
Garland, supra note 301, at 298 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Bost., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)).
324
See Allen, supra note 163, at 1063-64 (arguing that localities would often easily be
able to meet such a standard, citing protection of minors as justification for child
pornography prohibitions and zoning of adult businesses).
325
See Garland, supra note 301, at 317-18. This Comment does not contend that either
sodomy or sex toys are, in fact, unpopular.
326
Cf. United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2005) (reversing
a district court’s finding that Lawrence eliminated morality as a justification for obscenity
laws because of the doctrine that inferior courts may not determine that a directly applicable
Supreme Court precedent has been undermined by a later decision of the Court).
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centuries been the victims of both biased rules and stereotypical thinking, including
327
the longstanding inertia in the medical profession towards female sexuality.

The history of Western understanding of female sexuality, told
specifically through the development, use, and regulation of the vibrator,
makes clear the long-standing unequal treatment of women in social,
medical, psychological, and legal terms. It is a profoundly troubling tale
that, in the United States, has culminated in a circuit split over the ability of
male legislators to impose their views of morality and normalcy on women
and sexual minorities by way of statutes that essentially eliminate the
availability of the devices they prefer, and sometimes even need, for sexual
gratification. That much is almost universally accepted. Even the Williams
court indicates that the Alabama legislature’s regulation of sexual devices is
misguided. However, nothing in this tale of woe is a cognizable
constitutional argument.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits each heard challenges to these irksome
statutes based on the substantive due process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Though the courts came to opposite conclusions, both likely
reached the right result, if possibly for the wrong reasons. Because the
Alabama statute did not eliminate access to sexual devices, it likely did not
trigger strict scrutiny and so is a valid, reasonable exercise of the state’s
power to regulate public morality and to protect its citizens from obscene or
offensive materials. Because the Texas statute criminalized all means of
acquiring sexual devices, it properly deserved strict scrutiny and failed to
present either a compelling government interest or a narrowly tailored
approach. However, contrary to the actual position of the Reliable court
and the many scholars who have considered these decisions, there is little
reason to believe that there is a constitutional demand hidden in Lawrence
that required the Fifth Circuit to announce a new right to sexual privacy.
The Reliable court and its supporting scholars appear, ironically, to have
engaged Occam’s dildo328 in their push for what may be described as
justice, but cannot be described as constitutional law.
Neither circuit was asked to consider the equal protection implications
of the statutes, and for good reason. While there is clearly a disparate and
arguably devastating impact of these statutes on women and sexual
minorities, current equal protection doctrine cannot recognize that claim.
Similarly, though there may be a glimmer of hope in free expression
doctrine coupled with the Court’s vague statements in Lawrence, there is
327

Waldman & Herald, supra note 206, at 307-08.
See Mary Anne Case, Of Richard Epstein and Other Radical Feminists, 18 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 369, 372 n.9 (1995) (“While Occam’s razor requires that of two competing
explanations the simplest be selected, Occam’s dildo predicts that the most titillating of the
two explanations will be preferred.”).
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not yet any solid First Amendment avenue to challenging the statutes.
Those limitations may indicate flaws in the system—only time and future
rulings of the Supreme Court will tell.
However, that does not mean there is nothing to be done. The current
state of scientific research into female sexuality and orgasm is extremely
limited. This helps to mask the damage being done by the seemingly
neutral laws in Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia. Better and more
thorough medical and psychological investigations of female sexuality are
absolutely essential to the future of this fight. Better understanding will
force legislatures to consciously grapple with the effects of their outdated
preconceptions. Failing that, it may push or even empower the Supreme
Court to clarify Lawrence’s meaning for substantive due process, equal
protection, and the First Amendment in a way that is more protective of
women’s rights. The above quote decries the ability of the Court to cloak
itself in neutrality when applying invidious bias. This is only possible in
this context to the extent that scientific and medical understanding of
female sexuality isnon-representative, incomplete, and inconclusive. The
responsibility, therefore, falls to physicians, psychiatrists, and the people to
perform more and better research and, ultimately, to demand a reckoning,
whether legislative or judicial.

